Joetom:
Then understand how 100/150 batts could be replaced in service life and just waiting around to see what happens next, keep changing batts at that rate or hoping newer batts will fix the problem.
There are several entities involved in this chain of responsibility: Boeing, Thales, GSYuasa, Securaplane. Remind me if I've left anyone out. Before the fires, this was already a touchy issue. Who is responsible for and gets to pay for the maintenance? After the fires, I'm guessing that not one memo moves within or between any of these companies without corporate legal going over it with a fine-toothed comb.
I'm guessing Boeing were working hard on these batt issues before the two events than got the aircraft grounded, maybe they should of been working harder.
Both Boeing and the FAA with have to fully understand how this system was certified and allowed such shortfalls getting through the system.
Bothof these address process issues. and that is something which Boeing (and others?) regard as sacrosanct. Engineering and/or manufacturing errors? No problem. We'll fix them. But tell us how to manage the processes? That is going to result in some Boeing stonewalling.
When I was at Boeing, the very idea that some regulator could come in and tell us how to do business caused many managers to see red. Even when FAA mandated process changes saved us money, there was still a feeling that they should buzz of and leave us alone. I'm guessing that, what with outsourcing issues, Boeing is even more sensitive about this now.