Exactly. Read the report of the similar incident in 2007. The crew set the minima for a NPA, selected FLCH and then watched passively as it dived for the level set in the MCP. This seems to be an issue that should be addressed by the airline through training.
Not only that, in the latest incident the crew
were at Flap 1 the entire time, and in the 2007 incident, Flap 5 crossing BOL, then gear down flap 20 in level change.
The ATSB make absolutely no mention of the configuration (the word "flap" appears exactly once in the 2011 (AO-2011-086) final report) and no analysis of consequences for Non Precision approaches in either the 2007 or 2011 reports. I thought as an industry we were moving to being fully configured for straight in NPA's by the 3 degree descent point for CFIT mitigation. Not a hint of analysis.
Both reports contain lots of word, pretty pictures and complicated diagrams that would impress non-pilots. Yet it appears to add very little toward making safer, as witnessed by the fact the same operator had almost identical outcome in substantially similar circumstances at the same aerodrome only four years later.
What was learnt from either report?