Originally Posted by GobonaStick
You can't design out every possible combination of mishap. . . . Sometimes you just have to rely on people thinking before acting.
Agree. The A320 squat-switch problem in the overrun accident at Warsaw is another example. However people must act on known data or best guesses. Selecting reverse on landing is a normal procedure, the mechanical aspect of which is rarely prone to failure. The pilots could not have known that the reversers were not deployed and, having selected reverse, operated the thrust levers in accordance with that understanding. We could argue that the second application of thrust was "the cause" of the overrun but the source of the original problem was a reverse system design that permitted higher-than-idle thrust without deployed reversers while the thrust levers were in the familiar, reverse-thrust position. How does one apply "think before acting" in such a circumstance and still keep the airplane within the confines of the runway?
Originally Posted by Sunamer
I think the point is that even with nominal forward thrust instead of the reverse one, AC can stop safely.
Not sure what "nominal" means but if it means idle or close to idle forward thrust there is again nothing to be proven because that is a certification standard - ie.,
reverse thrust is not counted in stopping distance calculations.
And if it has been proven that the airplane can be stopped within the confines of the runway at thrust levels greater than idle, what has been proven except that? Do we then blame the crew for not, "thinking before acting"? How does this advance understanding for others such that another accident is prevented? If you'll recall, this was the second event of this type on this type of aircraft, the first one having occurred a week or so prior to this accident.