Hello Chris;
But one thing still bugs me: that sudden INDICATED loss of 300ft caused by the sudden drop of INDICATED IAS/CAS (my deliberate tautology). Pilots are generally unhappy to find they have lost (or gained) that much height in the cruise. The initial reaction may be to recover it asap, however unnecessary that haste may seem. Could this explain the PF's initial stick movement, if not the magnitude of it? If so, his subsequent preoccupation with roll control in roll-direct, and the startle factor causing him to tense up, may go some way to explaining his apparent inability to recognise his inappropriate pitch-up input, and correct it.
Yes, I think there is something to that in examining the data in the initial 12 to 14 seconds of the initiating (UAS) event. However, the altitude indication returned to FL350 within that time frame the pitch achieved was 10deg NU and rapidly increasing. The fact that no one who is experienced at flying these transports would maintain or even continue such attitudes and/or control inputs is sufficient I think to indicate a rapid loss of SA in terms of what transport aircraft are like to fly at cruise altitudes/high Mach numbers. A rapid return to nominal pitch attitudes in the first 20, possibly 30 seconds would have begun the stabilization process.
After the loss of energy and the increase of the AoA to about 6deg, the nose would have had to have been lowered say, to 5deg ND or even lower, for an effective initial attempt at recovery.
The air at cruise altitudes is, as we all are aware, very thin and the damping effects much reduced compared to the thicker air say, at FL200 so a long time would be needed to stabilize the airplane at that point.
At that point, the only awareness that would have saved the flight was an awareness that the wing was stalled. For a pilot who never hand-flew and who was raised and trained on auto-flight systems and who would never have seen a pitch attitude of say, -10 or -15deg, pointing the airplane down that far with an-already dramatically high VS would have been extremely challenging, but it was the only way to save the airplane.
It is gratifying to hear of so many changes being quietly implemented in training regimes and re-arranged priorities as a result of this tragic accident. That said, knowing how to fly a jet transport airplane using pitch and power in all flight regimes, normal and abnormal, is absolutely, fundamentally paramount in this business, period. Computers and autoflight are huge safety tools but are high-speed idiots that are dumber than a bag o' hammers when it comes to actually flying an airplane.