Gotta go with PJ2. Wolf and Lyman and others......
the inability on the part of all three crew members to assess as a stalled condition the high rate of descent which could not be arrested by pitching the nose up is, (as well as the absence of effective CRM and the lack of SOPs), set the pathway to this accident.
I have previously praised the aero characteristics of plane that made a stall so benign. Many planes would have been rocking/shuddering or even having uncontrollable roll. Then there's the attitude that " I can't stall this plane", not appreciating the reversion laws and such. Hence the comment about having kept the nose up for such a long time to no effect.
Besides that, what bothers me most is the initial reaction and initial control inputs. Why not just "hold what you have'? So the flight directors may have provided bad cues and the crew blindly followed them.
I, too, would appreciate a post from Andy as to the sim ride using the AF447 initial conditions. Was it set up after the loss of the A/P? Was it set up immediately prior to loss of the/ A/P? How much had Andy read about the whole profile? In other words, did the sim IP not say that this would duplicate AF447 but simply failed some air data inputs to get the A/P to disconnect? and the beat goes on....