Hello Arrakis. Dialogue in several forums has indicated a European leaning toward medium capacity helicopters; but past lessons of war-fighting are not being adequately heeded in my view.
'The Army's decision to standardize on a utility tactical transport helicopter has far-reaching implications on every operation from its planning to its execution. Literally hundreds of our key battles could not have been fought without a light, agile machine that could go into improbable landing zones at a critical time. Had the Army chosen to build its airmobile tactics around a "platoon carrier," different and less flexible tactics would have been forced on our commanders. As we move to replace the Huey fleet, we must never lose sight of the essential characteristics that made the Huey invaluable to the Infantry commander. Technology offers so many tempting alternatives that one can easily forget the basic problems of squad tactics. The vital lessons which we learned in the"sizing" of our helicopter fleet dare not be forgotten.' - Lieutenant General John J. Tolson, US Army from the study Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971.
The cabin layout of Iroquois from UH-1D onwards has not been bettered for platform battlefield support capability/flexibility. Regrettably, it was not emulated in the UTTAS competition so Blackhawk and other types also have internal obstruction problems with inboard armament stations, such as experienced by the Italians with the NH90.
General Tolson's reference to a light, agile machine is pertinent. The modernised Huey II is around half the weight of Blackhawks, NH90, UH-1Y and the like; acquisition costs of the heavier machines perhaps 10 times more than the Huey II and operating costs are many times higher.
Another lesson of the Vietnam conflict was the necessity for a 4 man crew in utility helos as the overwhelming majority of utility helicopter missions were conducted unescorted and usually as a single aircraft necessitating integral weapons capabilities.
'During this period of time, opinion varied on the necessity for door gunners on transport helicopters. Generally speaking, those not close to the action favoured elimination of the door gunner for the additional weight and space, while the transport helicopter pilots favoured the retention of the door gunner, without exception.' - Air Mobility Vietnam 1961-1971.
It was simply not cost-effective then, and moreso now, to provide escort for all helo operations, yet several nations are envisaging unarmed so-called light utility helicopters (LUH) to perform the most essential of intimate battlefield support roles. Light observation helicopters (LOH) were extensively employed in Vietnam being mostly unarmed, but they fell far short of the versatile capabilities of the Huey.
An emergent big issue mentioned earlier is being able to sustain an adequate level of operations for both Tiger and MRH90 in ADF service to maintain aircrew currency, due to high operating costs per flying hour. This problem will doubtless be encountered by other nations.
My view is aircraft manufacturers have lost sight of true utility helo functions and are pricing their much heavier more complex substitutes beyond affordability for general intimate battlefield support. The Italian experience in Afghanistan indicates the NH90 has about the same payload capacity at altitude as the Huey II which prima facie beats it for hot and high performance. European manufacturers would have been far wiser had they more or less cloned the single-engined Huey II.