Dozy;
Let me suggest the following as one response; - very slightly philosophical but fully applicable in practical circumstances; - a) In an instrumentally-informed world where the notions of "technique" are privileged over the widespread presence of actual comprehension and capability and, b) when economics, cost-accounting/control, the notions of "efficiency" and the need for results are driven by time pressures, then formula-thinking and rote learning take precedence over competence.
"CRM" was an early response to major fatal accidents occurring to perfectly serviceable airplanes in benign circumstances. In my opinion, "CRM" begins with what we used to call 'good breeding', which can very loosely be described as having good manners, reasonable self-respect, respect for others no matter who they are or what they do and a healthy but not overbearing ego. I do not think that these notions are culturally-specific and instead they apply widely even as they may be informed by local culture.
As the causal pathways to accidents gradually shifted from aircraft design/mechanical/weather/navigation etc. causes to accidents resulting from human frailties, ways to combat such frailties had to be found. We all have heard of those early off the mark with these notions such as Perrow, (1984), Reason, Helmreich, Foushee and later Dekker and many others who are equally wonderful in their work.
The continued assessment and explanations of causal pathways moved outwards from the minds of individual pilots-in-control to the dynamics of all crew members in a single cockpit to the notions of organizational "failures". The latter was a critical and important leap in my view, but the human psyche was not set aside in this more expansive view of why accidents continue to occur.
Human factors became the primary, almost the only challenge remaining in aviation safety. One solution was a kind of "substitution of capacity" where designers realized that microchips could do the mundane stuff while the human watched and monitored. Another was to recognize that humans view the world in an intensely self-consistent way. Normally this is of little consequence. Almost all decisions in the operation of an airplane are not critical but in an emergency or when increasing stress levels, one's perceptions and therefore decisions become increasingly invested. As we all know from experience, asking someone under significant stress, (or no stress at all when they ought to be!), to change their mind has varying responses, very few of them productive in their own right...The "captain-as-god" syndrome was one such circumstance.
CRM belongs to the category of "technique" in a technically-informed world. It "works" because it is short-term, target-oriented, goals-driven and outcome-tested. It is formula-based. In my view, "good breeding" etc works immensely better but I realize the limitations of such a view.
Ideally, "CRM" just becomes a formal label for a whole series of small and timely behaviours which keep the operational conversation going while a) maintaining cockpit gradient and b) sustaining situational awareness.
CRM didn't "save" 232 or 1549; - there was no CRM involved, but absence of it as well as the absence of SOPs, cockpit discipline and airmanship initiated the accident sequence in 447.
I would just call CRM good, intelligent, experienced airmanship essentially invisible to those who practise it. From what I can observe from the sidelines now I think we are on the verge of losing it because we dwell in an instrumental world where the notions of "good breeding" are less and less relevant and in which the substitution of mere technique for an abiding competence is increasingly acceptable because it is faster/better/cheaper.
Last edited by PJ2; 13th Feb 2013 at 22:17.