CLR/CRM etc.
PJ, thanks for taking the time to digest my comments.
Dozy, the human interaction in complex dynamic systems is critical. It was when Orville & Wilbur were doing their first transition from bikes to bipes. The environment has become more complex over time, and the energy levels have increased, but it has always been the case that the Wright Flyer or the J3 Cub can barely kill, but kill they will.
"CRM" is a loose term for human factors, and the focus is generally towards risk management. The early renditions were related to dealing with communications more or less a rehash of signal theory and an awareness of Gert Hofsteade's treatise, thereafter we went towards organisational causation per James Reason, expansion of team dynamics with Dan Maurino, HMI/automation by Asaf Degani & Earl Weiner, and thereafter towards SA, Mica Endsley & Co, Threat and Error Management etc, with additional research from Neil Johnson and Co, Gary Klein NDM, RPDM etc, and other facets of how we, humans work well and not so well with systems, and each other. This is not nearly an exhaustive review... There is a wealth of excellent research and committed individuals and institutions dealing with these vexatious issues across the globe.
My concern is however you package up the training potential that you get from these components of the total issue of human/system interaction (SHEL-SHELL etc if you must) then at the end of the day, it cannot be a replacement for the fundamental skill sets of dealing with an aircraft as a simple physical tool. Being unable to recognise a stall, or recover from a stall is an unacceptable point to have achieved. Having a wonderful interactive & immersive human factors program may reduce your potential exposure to ever getting stalled, but it will not stop the situation occurring. Nor will automation and smart systems, A320/330's etc stall quite well, just needs a dynamic change to exceed the program envelope and you are on your way to a fun ride. Don't even need a system failure, but they apparently happen routinely, (447, Perpignon, HDA 323 etc...). After all is said and done, being able to fly an aircraft remains a core function of being a Captain or FO, otherwise you are merely running a blood lottery.
The industry has elected to proceed down that path. Perhaps if the passengers think this is a great program, cost effective etc, and that the human can be removed from the system or be trained to not have human frailties, then maybe all is well. Doubt the family of 447 or 1549 would agree.
I believe in education and increased self awareness, as it assists in understanding the environment we work in. It is not a replacement for core skills, and that is what is currently killing us. IFLOC is an indictment on the direction the industry has gone, in cost cutting on core competencies. We need both to be functioning, not one replacing the other. Automation and smart systems not only give new issues for the human machine interface, they also give new opportunities for human error to enter in the design phase; it is not a panacea, more akin to a placebo.
to add to the misery of the programs, the assumption that systematic processes will automatically make you safe, or that compliance is an analogue for safety is an issue. Without boring anyone more than I have, SMS is fundamentally flawed, as are existing audit programs in the main. Few operators actually comprehend, or care to implement the functionality of the beautiful systems that are available and often installed gathering dust.
On another forum, an associate has made the pertinent point that the inanity of most safety related rhetoric is tiresome. There is ABSOLUTELY NO ORGANISATION out there that believes that "SAFETY IS OUT FIRST PRIORITY". Absolute marketing BS/hype. May make the regulators happy, and comfort the next of kin, makes no difference to the operators attitude to profit vs safety, has more value for potting plants in... If we are in the business of safety, then there should not be any aircraft or trains, ships operating. We are actually in the business of making a profit first and foremost with the lowest cost attributed to the needs of achieving safety at the level that is palatable by the public, otherwise known (somewhat misleadingly) as ALARP/ALARA.
Life is risky, we should get used to it. I get tired of listening to inanity, as does Mike Rowe... When did the CEO/Mgrs making decisions that impact operational safety last do a risk management training program, CRM, SA, or any other training related to their direct (and inexorable) impact on safety? MOL, the poisoned dwarf? Please tear down the 6 story high "Zero Defects" sign inside the hangar... if the system believed that then they are merely showing they are not aware they have humans with their natural variability within their organisation. (even more embarrassing when usually there are 2 or 3 broken aircraft underneath the sign, from crew performance issues).
Last edited by fdr; 13th Feb 2013 at 21:11.