fdr;
I accept your excellent clarifications regarding CRM as wise, within the context of present understandings of CRM. Some dismissed CRM as a course in courtesy, diplomacy and a leveling of the command-and-control process in modern cockpits.
Of course this is not what CRM is. Nor, as you point out, is CRM a "crew - cooperation" program - the cockpit is NOT a democracy! - somebody, (the captain) is required to make the decision.
CRM was a way of arriving at that decision so that all information available from all crew members in the cockpit is available, in a timely fashion, so that a decision, sometimes even a unilateral one by the captain though "buy-in" is always a goal, can be made, resolving the problem.
As you observe, CRM is nothing new to those who already knew how to communicate and fly, at the same time...
What has been forgotten by those who dismiss CRM or mistake it for what Haynes, Sully et al. all did are the origins of the need for "CRM".
CRM was originally a solution to the era during the 60's, 70's & even the 80's where, the "captain is god", the corollary being, 'god makes no mistakes.' The perception and sometimes even the reality was, if the F/O, the S/O, the F/E or the NAV raised a question, offered a suggestion or even directly challenged the captain, it was seen as "attempting to take over the airplane" or questioning the captain's authority. With some of the crustier guys (from WWII), one risked having one's head bit off.
CRM arose also from the opposite behaviour - no one was in command and therefore mission-critical decisions were either not made, or not made in time to save the operation. The UAL DC8 fuel-exhaustion accident at Portland, the classic, classroom example, where the flight's fuel situation was never managed to the point of resolution. Though other circumstances obtained, the Turkish accident has this quality.
There had to be a way to get the "neanderthals" as you use the term, to listen to others because they might actually have something useful to say, like "captain, should we be at this altitude in this area?"
I recall at the time of my CRM course around 1990, that the guys who needed the course most, never "got it" and dismissed CRM as a 'loss of the captain's authority" among other reactions, and those guys remained difficult to fly with, while the guys who understood what CRM was for, did well on the course because they were always that way anyway.
CRM is intended to deflect and otherwise work around those personal qualities which can interfere with and even completely stop communication between crew members in mission-critical, high-risk circumstances where the mere aberrant behaviour of those involved can become single points of failure which may cause the loss of the mission in a perfectly serviceable aircraft. Off the top of my head I can think of well over a dozen and a half major, fatal accidents which fall into this category.
And in this sense it can be argued that the Airblue accident at Islamabad, the AF 447 accident into the Atlantic, the Turkish accident under discussion on this thread and in certain ways the Colgan accident at Buffalo were all, first, profound failures of CRM. There are others.
CRM is something of a mini-intervention, which has been formalized into specific steps which require specific outcomes (resolutions and a plan of action) within a time-frame.
Had the principles of CRM been adhered to by the three crews involved in these accidents, the accident likely would not have occurred.
I agree entirely with the view that CRM had little to do with the outcomes of UA232, US Airways 1549. It was just intelligent, experienced, professional aviators doing their job together, and doing it well.
Last edited by PJ2; 13th Feb 2013 at 19:36.