MoD (UK) has bags of experience with Lithium batteries exhibiting what they euphemistically call “flaming events”. In 2006 there was a total recall and destruction order on Li-Ion secondary batteries (rechargeables) supplied for the BOWMAN HF radio. It took well over two years to replace them, a period in which users had to largely do without; despite being a Critical Enabling Technology.
There were numerous problems, all known in advance and ignored; partly because batteries are seen as faffy and a largely ignored commodity. In short;
1. The battery case was meant to be welded to prevent moisture ingress. It was crimped to save money.
2. The internal sensing electronics were meant to be potted, as a back up to protect from moisture ingress but also to provide robustness. The potting was entirely missing, again to save money.
Additionally, the BOWMAN specification required the “system” (battery, chargers, human) to permit 500 charges before replacement. I include human, because obviously the user has to receive information as to state of charge and be properly trained.
3. A typical battery could be recharged 3-5 times, meaning stocks had to be replenished (typically) 100 times more frequently than anticipated, requiring money for which no provision had been made.
4. It could not be recovered from even moderately deep discharge.
5. The state of charge indicator was not visible to the user in normal use.
Despite users having no control, over 3, 4 and 5, it became an offence in the Army to “permit” a battery to go into deep discharge.
1&2 are clearly Quality Control and Quality Assurance failures on the part of the contractor and MoD respectively (as well as fraud). I won’t say manufacturer, because the selected company didn’t actually make the battery, they bought in and assembled the parts. This is a recipe for disaster when they are also responsible for the chargers; and, indeed, 3, 4 & 5 are primarily a systems integration failure. What realistic chance is there of an assembler having a deep understanding of the system integration requirements? The AC and DC chargers, I think around 12,000 of them, were bought-in and were incompatible with the batteries.
I point this out because, from what I read here (and many of the observations are excellent), there would seem to be some similarities. Much is said of the battery manufacturer, but that is always too simplistic. The first thing I’d look at is the Interface Definition Documents detailing the boundaries of responsibility. One of MoD’s failures was not to have IDDs, which is like handing out blank cheques. In part, this explained why they simply handed the replacement contract to the same company, without competition, paying them twice for the same thing. Despite proper manufacturers selling the same battery (and compatible chargers), manufactured and operating to specification, for half the price. If there is a lesson to be learnt here by Boeing and their suppliers, it is this. Don’t ask MoD for advice! Rather, seek out the company who advised MoD of these forthcoming problems in the first place.