On the assumption of CRM efficacy
As I have stated previously, I am concerned with the distancing of the flight crew from the control loop, and I have reservations on the use of "CRM" training to be other than an reinforcement of skill sets that should have been a screening factor, rather than a cure for inadequate screening or pilot training.
"if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail" proverb, (variously Maslow/Baruch/Kaplan)
While it appears compelling on first glance that Al Haynes and Sully both commented positively on the benefits of CRM (gen1 for Al, gen1-6 for Sully), the accident reports show that the outcome was a result of the ability to control the energy and flight path of the aircraft in unusual circumstances. If CRM is to be attributed properly with value adding to the successful outcomes of the events, then there needs to be a clear cause-effect displayed, and the reports do not make that case at all. It is improbable that any crew member coming out of a high profile event and wanting to continue service with the same company or possibly same industry is going to say anything that is controversial at the time, or buck the hype that is being sprouted about the event. (remember the hammer/nail proverb?).
There is an apparent perception that before the advent of CRM programs, we pilots were all neanderthals, and unable to string a coherent sentence in polite company. The truth is that the good operations were always exhibiting the attributes that are now enshrined in formal CRM programs, which we can confirm as the CRM program developed from the evaluation of high performance teams coming from the group of neanderthals. Observation of differences in individual characteristics, management techniques and group dynamics provided the basis for the attempts to simplify these characteristics and techniques into sound bites that could be used for reinforcement training.
what is the evidence that exists that in the absence of attending a CRM class of either the gen1 or gen1-6 flavour, the outcomes would have not been successful?. These events are characteristically energy and flight path control problems, with a big smattering of critical (irreversible) decision making in conditions of uncertainty.
CRM is likely effective, but the evidence resides more in the daily successes of the vast majority of flight operations, for which the industry should rightly be proud of. The exceptional events do not necessarily support such assertions.
Playing devils advocate, one assumes if CRM is credited with the saves that occur anyway, then perhaps it should also be credited with the losses such as the CRM trained TP's of the A330-300 at Toulouse reverse parking, while communicating and discussing the issue all the way to impact. Apparently it is acceptable to remove the flightpath management and energy management from the equation... (these being pilot stuff...) which are covered by good team coordination etc. Lots of SA going on, just missed the bit about the planet being about to rise up towards their APU rapidly due to the extreme flight condition achieved. Same for 447 and to an extent 1951; lots of communication going on... not much piloting.