Originally Posted by
CDRW
You have almost trivialized the very act of airspeed monitoring. That pesky act of "improper monitoring" was, well, quite fatal.
I didn't say anything about airspeed monitoring - which, as you say, is a non-trivial and integral part of the scan, I said they did not monitor the *thrust* setting - which many have claimed is second-nature if an aircraft is fitted with an autothrottle system that physically moves the levers.
The fact the RA was out should have been but a minor inconvenience at best. As the speed approaches Vref most of us expect a power increase, a thrust lever movement, a spool up, the trend arrow to disappear.
Completely agree, but as I said, that's not what I was talking about.
Originally Posted by
Capn Bloggs
In this case, what are the "other lessons"?
A few off the top of my head:
- Seemingly trivial equipment failures can have serious consequences if the system is not properly understood
- Closer attention should be paid to repeating patterns of equipment failure on a specific type (in this case RA failures on the NG)
- Specific to the question of experience - the FO missed the erroneous thrust retard command and falling airspeed indication, but so did the very experienced ex-mil training Captain
Originally Posted by
BARKINGMAD
I was under the impression that the PF onboard AF447 maintained too high a nose attitude for the phase of flight
...
As opposed to the THY, where the PF maintained (manually or via the a/p) too high a nose attitude for the phase of flight...
Technically correct, but in the case of AF447 the PF deliberately pulled up and kept pulling up despite such inputs being wildly inappropriate for the flight phase. The THY crew as far as I know did not - their stall resulted from failing to monitor thrust and airspeed while holding what would be a normal pitch attitude for approach - your mileage may vary, but I think that's a pretty significant difference.
Repeating my third point above, given that the (experienced, ex-mil) training Captain and monitoring Captain - as well as the FO under training - missed the thrust setting and airspeed cues, I have trouble seeing how the "Children Of The Magenta" problem applies here. Have I missed something?
We have become "politically correct", and warm, caring crew following the social engineering of CRM programs...
That's not (or shouldn't be) what CRM is about. Of the books I've read and the pilots I've been privileged to speak to, one thing that crops up regarding CRM is that one of best recorded examples of how to do it is the CVR recording of UA232. The contents are not "politically correct". Capt. Haynes' language is very salty - in fact he swears like a trooper in places, and understandably so. The conversation is generally polite, but far from touchy-feely - overall what comes across is a sense of 100% dedication to solving the problem at hand.
As a result, by the time that aircraft is pointed at the Sioux City runway every person on the flight deck has a clear idea of the job they have to do, and their jobs are assigned such that the best person for the task is in fact the one handling it. *That* is what I'm told CRM is supposed - and was always intended - to be.