If the only failure that precipitated the THY accident was the AT inoperative, then there is a problem with achieving the systems risk management goals of paragraph 1309, per MIL STD 882E methodology. Basically, the failure case can occur regularly enough to have to not result in a catastrophic outcome... in fact as the outcome is evidently catastrophic... it is not supposed to happen without being able to be mitigated by the system architecture. The THY event is not the only occasion that the fundamental failure of crew to remain aware of their system performance has occurred, and it won't be the last. Some fairly respectable operations have come undone with the loss of crew SA due to complacency and expectancy of nominal system operation. In a close coupled operation, there is a high cost to such outcomes. We have become "politically correct", and warm, caring crew following the social engineering of CRM programs, however the extent of SA failure, and the atrophy of basic skills that permit a recovery from a simple failure once recognised is an abject industry wide failure.
In respect to the medical profession, it would be hoped that it has the ability to take the hard lessons learned in the aviation experience, and avoid the traps that have occurred in the establishment of protective protocols. IMHO, the single most significant factor is the general disconnect between policy and implementation, both in aviation and the medical community. Until the slip between the stated intent and the perceived attitude of systems is removed, it is not likely that interventions will be more than bandaid solutions.
Last edited by fdr; 7th Feb 2013 at 21:32.