@BARKINGMAD:
The salient difference between the two is down to phase of flight - I think what shocks a lot of people about AF447 was that it happened in cruise, and as such despite having 38,000ft of altitude to recover, the crew was unable to. The THY aircraft was on finals, and the margin for error in that situation is considerably less.
As far as I know the THY aircraft was being handled correctly aside from improper monitoring of what the autothrust was doing. Remember that the first hole in the cheese was a faulty RA on the Captain's side feeding bad data to the autothrust system. One of the hypotheses put forward was that because the crew were expecting a reduction in thrust at that point, they simply did not double-check by how much thrust was being reduced. This provides an interesting counterpoint to the "moving thrust levers are always better" argument.
While the accident flight was a check ride (and by extension the flight deck workload was higher than average), the flight crew aside from the FO under training were no novices - at least one was ex-military and a veteran Captain.
The consternation over the increase in reliance on technology and how that reliance affects basic flying skills and experience is understandable (and despite my reputation on here I think it's a valid - if often misunderstood - concern). But we must all be careful not to try to hammer accident analysis into a shape that will fit that perception because it risks obscuring other lessons that can be learned.