As the stomach churns.
It's a fair question – just how much individual, unchecked power does a manager have?
When you get down and dirty on the Special Procedures Manual (SPM) and Safety Trend Index (STI) system you find that Transair, of Lockhart River fame had an audited STI score of 15, the normal red flag is raised at seven. Safety alert, No, Show cause, No? kick in the pants, No?; but shortly afterward they are granted significant changes in the AOC despite clear evidence that under the 'robust' CASA system this was the last thing that should happen.
There is no empirical evidence that the Operations Manual was significantly amended to rectify any of the items reflected in their STI score. There is no data to support the idea that the audit was 'audited' and that changes, if any, were ticked off. The failings in the oversight system were huge and 15 people died.
Pel Air - same - same. Only in this case we have the auditors investigating their audit: now how in all the hells does that happen? Even more intriguing are the resignations shortly afterward by people who were eminently qualified to assess the operation, the audit and the proposed corrections.
In part, the 'investigation' process, was supposedly to determine if previous RCA and audited deficiencies had been corrected; and that both the CASA and P-A systems were functioning correctly. So we task the auditors to examine their own work – sorry, but why am I not surprised that despite a fairly hefty STI count and no positive proof of improvement a Safety Alert was waived and evidence deeply buried. P-A was back in business within a Christmas week of the "changes" being initiated. It would take a week of hard work just make to amendments let alone have them tested, accepted, executed and ticked off. The required training programs alone would have taken a week full to complete.
Seems there exists either a massive systematic failure; or a truck load of discretionary power at work. Compared to Hardy, Barrier, Airtex and a couple of others where the 'managers' discretion is used to produce the desired outcome you just have to ask questions of the system, the integrity of the audit and the investigation process. Is the system there to ensure a safety outcome, or to produce a safe outcome under discretionary privilege? Quick twirl of the red pen – problems all go away; shut up or resign. Men of integrity did.
I find it intriguing that Airtex had independent, senior, experienced ICAO 'qualified' auditors determine a clean bill of health for the operation and were shot down in flames by, shall we say, slightly less qualified people; and had a safety alert issued on the flimsiest grounds; yet P-A in seven days, over Christmas manage to convince almost the same audit/ investigating team that all was well.
Here Johnny, mark your own exam paper. What a system. Unbelievable? check it out your self, all there on the public record.
Last edited by Kharon; 6th Feb 2013 at 01:19.