Sarcs, it's interesting reviewing these 2 audits independently. Some highlights (or should I say high****es) are:
- In 2008 80% of the 20 FLT crew reviewed had no evidence of life jacket/raft training. Then after the ditching in 2009 the special audit found inadequate life raft refresher training. Not much changed in 12 months.
- In 2008 that audit uncovered basically nil FRMS training. Then again in 2009 after the ditching the special audit found inadequate FRMS policy/procedures.
- And the RCA's. Mr RC signed the RCA's that were written by Mr MH, Mr BC and Mrs KS. WTF?
Although questions about Pelair are obvious and inevitable, my interest is in the Regulators oversight, ability and activities during this time period. What were they doing? The similarities to Lockhart are more than concerning. CASA is meant to be oversighting safety yet here are 2 accidents that occurred not long after CASA had been 'hanging around'? Is the role of the CASA pretty much redundant? They certainly don't appear to add any value to safety? They certainly don't seem capable of identifying risk prior to accidents? Proactive vs reactive I hear you say? The CASA are reactive! And as far as I am concerned when it comes to organisational culture CASA are pathological. If they were an airline I would rather take my chances and cross the pacific ocean on a Segway than fly with them.
The holes in the cheese are big enough to fly a Starlifter through. How much longer? Over to you Senators.