poorjohn,
Those who've worked in aerospace manufacturing over the past few decades will realize the truths in the HBR article.
You are absolutely correct!
John Farley,
My reading of the article is that it suggests it is very dangerous to outsource the design, development and manufacture of elements of a complex system before the interactions between the various elements are completely understood. Indeed it queries whether you cannot even write a decent outsourcing contract until all the interactions are understood.
So very true! Couple this together with language differences, although what may be presented to the outsourcer, written in English, the actual instructions for the workers are in the language of the out-source manufacturer, are they the same? Sometimes, they are not.
WilyB,
Japan is not exactly "low cost" but the Japanese government subsidies to the tune of over $3B to the Japanese company involved in the 787 program was too good to pass.
You bet! And both major Japanese airlines selected 787s not A-350s, not a coincidence I think.
Lyman,
2. He discusses "Organizational boundaries" when I am virtually certain what he means are "Interdisciplinary Theories".
You misunderstand. Organizational boundaries is exactly that. If you design and make section A, and I design and make section B we have to talk as they have to go together and work properly. And we both have to talk to those who design and make sections C, D, and E to be sure everything goes together and works. When you outsource all of the sections for design and build, it becomes crossing organization boundaries, think multiple corporation boundaries that adds complexity to something that is already complex. It is not "theory" at all.
PAXboy,
Some people think that - when you outsource - you can get away with less central control. But it is the other way around. The more you outsource, the more you need people at the centre who REALLY know what they are doing.
Absolutely correct!
It doesn't seem this worked well as a retired Boeing Exec. indicated.
Lyman,
But MOSTLY with the possibility that BOEING may have acted unilaterally, without disclosure, and illegally, in the way they addressed a very serious problem.
Can you substantiate this possibility, especially the illegal part?
Lyman,
They appear to have replaced sufficient batteries to refit the entire fleet, PRIOR TO DISCLOSURE to the authority, whose job it would be then to assess the problem, accept or reject new solutions, and perhaps issue an AD.
Not to mention disclosing to the public the nature of the issue.
Can you substantiate this as a fact? Can an airline change out all the engines on a 747, a 767, a 777 or a 787, not knowing what a problem might be, without notifying the FAA? What about the aircraft manufacturer?
During the testing process for the 747, 87 engines were used, 60 were destroyed during the testing process. Boeing had a dozen 747s sitting around with cement blocks suspended from the wings due to lack of engines. None of this prevented certification. The 747 was certified. Then, PanAm had six 747s sitting on the ground at JFK without engines when a new problem came up during revenue service. The FAA never grounded the airplane. Eventually the unknown causes of the problem were identified and all the PanAm planes began to fly again. As a Boeing Exec. said at the time "It is no fun producing gliders when your customer thinks you are producing a jet aircraft." I am sure that today's Boeing Executives are saying the same thing. I am also sure that everyone is working diligently and very hard to identify and correct the electric problem (note I say electric as it may not be the battery). Boeing just is not as swift to identify the problem as you seem to be or as you perceive Boeing should be to in getting to the goal line.