Can I clarify your opinion? Are you saying the VSOs could fix it by doing proper Requirement Scrutiny?
When conducting RS the final declaration and signature is more often than not made by someone really quite junior (the project or programme manager with the technical and financial approval delegation). Even if you have one of the lesser delegations, you’ll still have sufficient power to sign for, say, £20M, which is enough for the vast majority of milestone payments. Bear in mind a financier does not approve expenditure, only endorses it. That is, the person with technical and financial delegation makes the written declaration that the proposed spend is “fair and reasonable” against a rigorous test (the main Requirement Scrutiny); the financier then “merely” writes down where and when the money is in the budget).
The basic problem arises when someone above you has, for example, already given the nod to the “requirement” or is applying pressure for delivery to be accepted. Pressure is applied to sign, not because they want to waste money, but because they do not want to be seen to be wrong or made to look foolish by a subordinate.
In theory, this should not be a problem if handled tactfully, but in practice it is seldom that simple. These days, very few are taught that when conducting RS you are not working for your line manager or superior, but direct to PUS. This is a difficult concept for superiors to accept, but once they do the sensible ones usually step back.
However, if he does apply pressure, at least the superior is acknowledging the subordinate’s delegated powers, and reasoned debate can take place (if the subordinate doesn’t cave in). Not caving in is part of the test that (should be) applied before granting delegation. (Which is another problem – delegation used to be a big deal; today it’s handed out to totally unsuitable staff).
Of greater concern is when a superior has self-delegated that technical and financial approval and over-rules the lower ranked person who does have the necessary delegation, and signs-off the approval himself. This is more normal among Civil Servants, since the advent of non-technical project/programme managers (who, by definition, cannot possibly have technical and financial delegation). This leads to situations whereby the project team is actually upside-down, as the subordinate has infinitely more authority and responsibility than the superior. This act of self-delegation is of course illegal, but if contained to financial matters “only” results in astronomical waste.
But in my experience, by far the worst examples have involved self-delegation and over-rules on both financial
and technical/safety design issues. It is one thing to knowingly waste money, but when accompanied by decisions that render the equipment unsafe is simply criminal. The former is fraud, the latter can lead to manslaughter (and, of course, has done).
All of the examples I quote were subsumed within the rulings I mention.
So, it’s not a case of the VSOs doing proper RS, it’s a case of them allowing and encouraging it by refusing to countenance the type of behaviour I describe. Leading, not managing. As I’ve said before, the root of the recent rulings is 2/3/4 Stars actively preventing RS, by taking disciplinary action against those who try to do it properly.
Have you tried bringing the above to the attention of a decent investigative journalist?
Yes, but not interested, mainly because they don’t understand. I can understand this up to a point, but the real problem is that it has been formally brought to the attention of the MoD Police, PUS, Ministers, Public Accounts Committee, House of Commons Defence Select Committee, Civil Service Commissioners and, recently, Head of the Civil Service; and all have been seen to condone it. I fully accept that “all” these people do is refer the matter to MoD for comment, who simply ensure that the reply comes from a source who has most to lose if the policy is revealed.
In my mind it is the same as the closely related airworthiness failures (demonstrably, it was this waste, by AMSO, that caused them in the first place). For years the same thing happened. Letters to Ministers were referred to precisely the same MoD department, who replied on their behalf with the same words, year after year, denying any problem. But finally, if you persevere, you find a way of getting through. As happened on Mull of Kintyre, for example, you get to actually speak to a Minister who is prepared to listen and ask just one awkward question. (In the case of MoK, on the CHART report). Then the perpetrators’ lies are publicly exposed at the most senior level, they turn on each other and all is revealed. But the catalyst is an independent inquiry. As with airworthiness, the system at present cannot cope with the concept of anyone knowingly wasting money (or making an aircraft unsafe). In MoD there simply is no mechanism to counter an illegal order to waste money, not least because the perpetrator is allowed to judge his own case. This must change and, in fact, it is the only aspect that requires a formal change of rules. The rest is implementation of extant rules. Exactly the same as the airworthiness failures.