SASless
it cannot be ascertained if the aircraft's Nav system was serviceable for operational flight?
As I said above, read the evidence. There were multiple faults in the navigation system, including time of day and a u/s power supply. I barely understand that, but the evidence got even more technical and revealed a mistake in the basic GPS specification that was only corrected in later years.
Absent that Document....or if the Document contained a restriction that the NAV system was not to be relied upon....why would the aircraft be in Operational service?
According to the evidence given to Philips, that document was obtained and analyzed for the first time during that inquiry. There is an entire section devoted to a lie MoD told a widow, when they claimed in 2010 the document didn't exist. I'd have loved to be a fly on Philips' wall when he was given MoD's letter and copy of the non-existent document.
I think it boils down to this. Philips confirmed the CA release was "mandated", meaning the RAF were not allowed to disregard it. This said "Switch On Only", not to be relied upon in any way. ACAS did disregard it, and in his RAF release to service did not pass on the "switch on only" restriction to crews as this would mean the aircraft could not be flown operationally, if at all. The evidence to Philips offers evidence that this was a serious offence.
What makes this evidence compelling to a complete outsider like me is that it references and extensively quotes MoD documents most of which it would seem had never been offered to previous inquiries. It is 100% factual and doesn't contain a single theory, which I think would have impressed a legal man. On the other hand, theories were ignored, which I think is the correct thing to do. Happy to be corrected if I'm wrong.