They did not make a request for "'what do we do". They elicited information as would any crew and made their own decisions with respect to the information received.
According to Alaska Airlines documents, ATC and CVR information, and postaccident interviews with Alaska Airlines dispatch and maintenance personnel, the flight crew contacted the airlines dispatch and maintenance control facilities in SEA some time before the beginning of the CVR transcript at 1549:4912 to discuss a jammed horizontal stabilizer and a possible diversion to Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Los Angeles, California. These discussions were conducted on a shared company radio frequency between Alaska Airlines dispatch and maintenance facilities at SEA and its operations and maintenance facilities at LAX.
At 1549:56, the autopilot was disengaged; it was re-engaged at 1550:15.
According to the CVR transcript, at 1550:44, SEA maintenance asked the flight crew, understand youre requesting
diversion to LA
is there a specific reason you prefer LA over San Francisco? The captain replied, well a lotta times its windy and rainy and wet in San Francisco and uh, it seemed to me that a dry runway
where the wind is usually right down the runway seemed a little more reasonable.
At 1552:02, an SEA dispatcher provided the flight crew with the current SFO
weather (wind was 180° at 6 knots; visibility was 9 miles). The SEA dispatcher added, if uh you want to land at LA of course for safety reasons we will do that
well
tell you though that if we land in LA
well be looking at probably an hour to an hour and a half we have a major flow program going right now. At 1552:41, the captain replied, I really didnt want to hear about the flow being the reason youre calling us cause Im concerned about overflying suitable airports. At 1553:28, the captain discussed with the first officer potential landing runways at SFO, stating, one eight zero at six
so thats runway one six what we need is runway one nine, and theyre not landing runway one nine. The first officer replied, I dont think so. At 1553:46, the captain asked SEA dispatch if they could get some support or any ideas from an instructor to troubleshoot the problem; he received no response. At 1555:00, the captain commented, it just blows me away they think were gonna land, theyre gonna fix it, now theyre worried about the flow, Im sorry this airplanes [not] gonna go anywhere for a while
so you know. A flight attendant replied, so theyre trying to put the pressure on you, the captain stated, well, no, yea.
At 1556:08, the SEA dispatcher informed the flight crew that, according to the SFO automatic terminal information service, the landing runways in use at SFO were 28R and 28L and that it hasnt rained there in hours so Im looking at
probably a dry runway. At 1556:26, the captain stated that he was waiting for a requested center of gravity (CG) update (for landing), and then he requested information on wind conditions at LAX. At 1556:50, the SEA dispatcher replied that the wind at LAX was 260° at 9 knots.
Nine seconds later, the captain, comparing SFO and LAX wind conditions, told the SEA dispatcher, versus a direct crosswind which is effectively no change in groundspeed
I gotta tell you, when I look at it from a safety point I think that something that lowers my groundspeed makes sense.16 The SEA dispatcher replied, thatll mean LAX then for you. He then asked the captain to provide LAX operations with the information needed to recompute the airplanes CG because they can probably whip out that CG for you real quick. At 1558:15, the captain told the SEA dispatcher, were goin to LAX were gonna stay up here and burn a little more gas get all our ducks in a row,
and then well uh be talking to LAX when we start down to go in there. At 1558:45, the captain asked LAX operations if it could compute [the airplanes] current CG based on the information we had at takeoff.
At 1602:33, the captain asked LAX operations for wind information at SFO. LAX operations replied that the winds at SFO were 170° at 6 knots. The captain replied, thats what I needed. We are comin in to see you. At 1603:56, the first officer began giving LAX operations the information it needed to recompute the airplanes CG for landing.
At 1607:54, a mechanic at Alaska Airlines LAX maintenance facility contacted
the flight crew on the company radio frequency and asked, are you [the] guys with the uh, horizontal [stabilizer] situation? The captain replied, affirmative, and the mechanic, referring to the stabilizers primary trim system, asked, did you try the suitcase handles and the pickle switches? At 1608:03, the captain replied, yea we tried everything together. At 1608:08, the captain added, weve run just about everything if youve got any hidden circuit breakers wed love to know about em. The mechanic stated that he would look at the uh circuit breaker uh guide just as a double check. The LAX mechanic then asked the flight crew about the status of the alternate trim system, and, at 1608:35, the captain replied that it appears to be jammed
the whole thing, it [the AC load meter] spikes out when we use the primary, we get AC [electrical] load that tells me the motors tryin to run but the brake wont move it. when we use the alternate, nothing happens.
At 1608:50, the LAX mechanic asked, you say you get a spike
on the meter up there in the cockpit when you uh try to move it with the
primary right? According to the CVR transcript, at 1608:59, the captain addressed the first officer before responding to the mechanic, stating, Im gonna click it off you got it. One second later, the first officer replied, ok. At 1609:01, the captain reiterated to the LAX mechanic that the spike occurred when we do the primary trim but theres no appreciable uh change in the uh electrical uh when we do the alternate. The LAX mechanic replied that he would see them when they arrived at the LAX maintenance facility.