No Dozy, your wrong. Read the report. So when the pilots trimmed for an altitude, it would hold, then give...then they needed to retrim for the next place that held...this went on and on and on, until such time trim wouldn't cover the problem,
Wrong. Read the report.
FDR data indicated that the horizontal stabilizer’s last movement during the climbout was to 0.4º airplane nose down at 1349:51 as the airplane was climbing through 23,400 feet at 331 knots indicated airspeed (KIAS). After this, no horizontal stabilizer movement was recorded on the FDR until the airplane’s initial dive 2 hours and 20 minutes later.
The passengers had the wrong pilots that day
Absolute nonsense. You can sit in your lounge chair as a non pilot and Monday morning quarter back the decisions made by the crew with 20/20 hindsight, but I venture any typical line crew probably would have made the same decisions.
2.2.5 Flight Crew Decision-Making
2.2.5.1 Decision to Continue Flying Rather than Return to PVR
Safety Board investigators considered several reasons that might explain the captain’s decision not to return immediately to PVR after he experienced problems with the horizontal stabilizer trim system during the climbout from PVR.
Neither the Alaska Airlines MD-80 Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) Stabilizer
Inoperative checklist nor the company’s QRH Runaway Stabilizer emergency checklist required landing at the nearest suitable airport if corrective actions were not successful. These checklist procedures were the only stabilizer-related checklist procedures contained in the QRH, and the flight crew most likely followed these checklist procedures in their initial attempts to correct the airplane’s jammed stabilizer
The airplane’s takeoff weight of 136,513 pounds was well below the takeoff and climb limits for the departure runway, but it exceeded the airplane’s maximum landing weight of 130,000 pounds. Because the airplane did not have an in-flight fuel dumping system, the airplane would have had to remain in flight for about 45 minutes after takeoff until enough fuel had burned to reduce the airplane’s weight by the 6,500 pounds needed to reach the airplane’s maximum landing weight. A return to PVR to execute an overweight landing would have required higher than normal approach speeds for landing and would have created additional workload and risk. An overweight landing at PVR would have been appropriate if the flight crew had realized the potentially catastrophic nature of the trim anomaly. However, in light of the airplane’s handling characteristics from the time of the initial detection of a problem to the initial dive, the flight crew would not have been aware that they were experiencing a progressive, and ultimately catastrophic, failure of the horizontal stabilizer trim system.
The flight crew would have been aware that Alaska Airlines’ dispatch and
maintenance control in Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, and LAX could be contacted by radio (via ground-based repeater stations) when the airplane neared the United States. However, even though the last horizontal stabilizer trimming movement was recorded by the FDR about 1349:51, the flight crew did not contact Alaska Airlines’ maintenance until shortly before the beginning of the CVR transcript about 1549,225 which suggests that control problems caused by the jammed horizontal stabilizer remained manageable for some time. Further, as previously mentioned, the positive aerodynamic effects of the higher cruise airspeed and fuel burn would have reduced the necessary flight control pressures to roughly 10 pounds and made the airplane easier to control. Therefore, the Safety Board concludes that, in light of the absence of a checklist requirement to land as soon as possible and the circumstances confronting the flight crew, the flight crew’s decision not to return to PVR immediately after recognizing the horizontal stabilizer trim system malfunction was understandable.
Although they elected not to return to PVR, later in the flight the flight crew
decided to divert to LAX, rather than continue to San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California, where the flight was originally scheduled to make an intermediate stop before continuing to SEA. Comments recorded by the CVR indicated that the flight crew may have felt pressure from Alaska Airlines dispatch personnel to land in SFO.227 However, after discussing the malfunctioning trim system and current and expected weather conditions at SFO and LAX with Alaska Airlines dispatch and maintenance personnel, the captain decided to land at LAX rather than continue to SFO. The decision to divert to LAX was apparently based on several factors, including more favorable wind conditions at LAX (compared to a direct crosswind at SFO) that would reduce the airplane’s ground speed on approach and landing228 and the captain’s concern, expressed to Alaska Airlines dispatch personnel, about “overflying suitable airports.” The Safety Board concludes that the flight crew’s decision to divert the flight to LAX rather than continue to SFO as originally planned was prudent and appropriate. Further, the Safety Board concludes that Alaska Airlines dispatch personnel appear to have attempted to influence the flight crew to continue to SFO instead of diverting to LAX.