Aircraft have become "simpler to fly" but more complex in how the automation can fail. The biggest killer of passengers and crew in Western Jets according to western jet maker Boeing is Pilot Loss of Control. Around 2000 people are no longer with us over a ten year period:
www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf
Interestingly the alarming rise in Upset incidents has co-incided with the reduction in flying experienced required to gain a CPL/frozen ATPL.
Airmanship has been lost and it is significant that one of the most respected airlines in the EU with it's own "top grade/integrated JAR" training course put two JAR cadet pilots at the helm of an A330 that ended up still in flyable condition in the South Atlantic with the loss of all 228 on board - most of us know the sad tale of AF447.
Yes they had 1000s of Airbus hours (in the cruise) but very little experience beforehand - It was exactly the kind of course that CTC, OAA and others sell to individuals wishing to follow an "integrated" approach. In fact the AF course was better - it had a proper job at the end of it and the students did not face the huge financial pressures we hear of here.
However,this A330 FO and SO did not have military style training where even at 15h an Army student can recover from an Incipient Spin, or a few sorties later be able to cope with a low level bird strike or a low level abort into IMC with a stuck throttle.
Unlike their Captain who was asleep in the rear of the A330, they had no significant GA background - one had flown a glider a couple of times but how many years ago is not mentioned in the BEA report. So they went from less than 200h course straight into one of the most automated jets in history - the A320. A few years later an abbreviated conversion onto the A330 with even less sectors and opportunities for hands on flying.
Their aeronautical knowledge left much to be desired - particularly regarding high altitude flight - something the regulators never checked apart from the initial ATPL multiple guess papers they sat at over 10 years before.
Their CRM was hugely lacking - after stalling the aircraft they ignored the warnings and did not cross check understanding. Indeed, when the stall warner gave up and the Captain re-appeared, they failed to tell him what had happened - so he was out of the loop entirely.
Now look at other EU airlines and those that employ the most cadets. Apart from Lufthansa (which trains it's cadets alongside Luftwaffe trainees in the USA before a Twin Jet IR in Germany), most use the "big" schools like CTC, OAA etc. This means self funding all the way. And that also means there is a large element of "self selection".
Sadly some integrated course flying instructors have been shocked by the lack of desire for hands on flying that many Integrated students have - many just want the shiny suit and jet job image they are "entitled to" having paid £120k or more getting through the hoops/ticking the boxes. Some are downright scared of flying a light aircraft or practising stall recovery.
These schools have, to their credit, introduced an element of Upset recovery to the new MPL being promoted. However, the MPL trains co-pilots - and it can be legally done with just 70h of real flying. No one dies in the SIM - its just a computer game. So these cadets are being ripped off as they are not given the chance to develop real airmanship - like what to do with a nose wheel shimmy on take off or a fuel leak or weather closing in on their solo x-country trip. And paying passengers are underpaying the real cost of flying without realising the lack of real world flying experience in the front seats.
EZY now has crews that are perfectly competent when things are going right - with no other background than what the A330 crew had plus a few more debts. Total time up front lower than 4000h - of which probably 400h were hands on. You only have to read the concerns in CHIRP to know things aren't right.
www.chirp.co.uk/downloads/ATFB/ATFB101.pdf
Across the atlantic we had Colgan Q400 crash. Colgan 3407. The Captain was P2F before joining Colgan - he paid to fly pax on a B1900. His co-pilot was a fair wx instructor with minimal night/IMC time. They operated on LoCo budgets - the FO's pay was less than an airport toilet cleaner's.
http://www.operationorange.org/colganQ&A.pdf
Result? 50 more people no longer with us.
Most US jet carrier require a min of 700h. Congress want that to be 1500h - there are arguments both ways. But 700h UK CPL route weeded out a lot of no flyers - it took perseverance - some took 8 years to get a well paid flying job. But that kind of tenacity and resilience is a large part of taking a longer view and not rushing youngsters into cockpits - we are not fighting the Battle of Britain - young life is not that expendable and neither are pax's lives.
The current UK Pilot Training System is failing the student and reducing fllght safety for airline pax.
OOA's Anthony Petteford is right to be concerned by the apparent lack of Pilot mentoring by airlines. The MPL has it's place but it requires a rethink - particulary of the confidence building solo time and apprenticeship areas. Cadets are not necessarily being trained to the highest possible standard, rather to a minimum regulatory standard with minimal course flexibilty due to high costs and an unwillingness for some schools to change. In addition the modular route is seen as a second class citizen.
Now the CAA looks set to make life even harder (financially) for the latter by mandating further cost on the individual who is not MPL approved through a JOC. Given previous studies such as the Cranfield University FORCE (investigation into Type Rating training and manual flying skills) and ICATEE / RAeS concerns over airline piloting skills, something more than just an MPL or modular plus JOC is needed.
We need still aviators not just ticks in the right boxes:
Ref: US Airways 1549: A320 Hudson ditching: Was Capt Sullenberger an MPL? Did he have a GA background in gliding? Did he fly for the Military?
US Airways Flight 1549 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Ref: QF32 Qantas A380 engine and system failures: How much experience was in the front seats?
From the RAeS interview: "Captain David Evans is a Senior Check Captain at Qantas with some 32 years of experience and 17,000hrs of flight time. At the time of the incident he was in one of the observers’ seat, and thus had a ring-side view of the drama as it unfolded. The other flight deck crew were Richard de Crespigny (Pilot in Command, 15,000hrs), Harry Wubben (Route Check Captain, 20,000hrs) Matt Hicks (First Officer, 11,000hrs and Mark Johnson (Second Officer 8,000hrs). With the Cabin Service Manager (Michael Von Reth) this team boasted some 140 years of experience and over 71,000 flight hrs – a significant factor in the successful outcome of the incident."
A radical aeronautically based rethink on both training and recruitment is required.
The alternative is almost unthinkable.