Learned Lessons
LoneWolf, you have raised a key point, and you are correct in applying the RAH-66 program as the foil.
Taking the bare S-97 just as the flying platform, the costs of that part, while inevitably higher than the 58, will be higher incrementally to reflect the hardware technology that results in the vastly improved performance.
The program costs to be wary of are the system costs. During Comanche, much higher sums were being spent on system development than on the flight program. Yet, the flight program was eminently successful, whereas the system program was not. The pilots never got to fly " the system" except in the sim. And whereas Boeing and SA had their best people working Comanche flight, the same was not so with systems, a lot of which had been sub'd. I used to play golf on Sunday mornings with the head of flight test ( a Boeing man who was simply the best ), a Boeing Test Pilot, and an Army Test Pilot. Too much of the conversation had to do with the pilots telling us about their sim efforts to train the systems design guys how a helicopter flew, what the mission was in reality, what info was critical to pilots vs what was incidental, etc etc.. Goal posts moved. Missing software drop dates was OK.
Just my personal opinion, but that sort of situation isn't necessarily inevitable on the new Scout, and it should be priority one on everyone's mind. If someone were to mention the Canadian MHP program as another example in this area of development cost/schedule how-not-to-do-it, I probably know several pilots who would agree.