If I were the Army, and I was looking at the manpower bill the Army looks at, and the logistics bill, and the next twenty years on procurement, I'd probably try to wege MORE UAV capability into the scout role, and rather than buy a new helicopter I'd keep the OH-58F momentum. What I'd also do is shrink the size of the active Scout (OH-58F) fleet and keep a nice bundle of spares at Davis Monthan or somewhere like that.
In preservation. Or in a state for a kit conversion to replace combat losses.
But I am not the Army.
Question for John Dixson:
The 97 looks to me, as a pilot, like a nice mix of potential attack/scout capability with nominal utility capability. The problem with that platform, as I see it, is similar to the problem that Comanche ran into at the programatic level, and one that is raising flags for the JSF/F-35 at present.
Below a certain number on order, the per unit cost will raise red flags all over the place in the
PR war, regardless of what new and improved capability such a step forward would produce.
So on to the question: what lessons learned from Comanche, and what the program addressed in terms of the risks of new technology, can the 97 team apply as it bids for being the next armed scout?