All bolding by me
DozyWannabe
@BOAC - A "Dual Input" rumbler would have worked just as well in that situation - equally, as I said, the CVR suggests that the PNF was aware of what the PF was doing, but felt unable to take control, instead electing to wait for the Captain to return - by which time the situation was arguably irrecoverable.
It is helpful, to reread the report. Your above assumption is just that, an unfounded assumption.
Four seconds after the autopilot disconnection, the rapid increase in nose-up attitude resulted in the triggering of the STALL 1 warning. This warning only appeared to provoke a small aeroplane handling reaction from the PF. The PNF asked “What is that?” which may refer to the stall warning. It is possible that the PNF, faced with a short, truncated warning, did not identify it. However, rather than indicating his failure to recognise the warning, this question seems to mean that the PNF did not consider the warning to be relevant in the context of the fact that he was not necessarily aware of:
ˆˆ- The PF’s significant nose-up inputs that generated an increased angle of attack;
-ˆˆThe relative proximity of a flight envelope limit;
-ˆˆThe reconfiguration to alternate law (which he only called out later): if he thought they were still in normal law, the warning could have seemed to be irrelevant.
It would also seem unlikely that the PNF could have determined the PF’s flight path stabilisation targets. It is worth noting that the inputs applied to a sidestick by one pilot cannot be observed easily by the other one.....
later on...
The PNF had noticed the need to stabilise the flight path, and the need for moderate aeroplane handling inputs. He probably considered that the reduction in pitch and the vertical acceleration sensed was a sufficient sign that the PF would correct the flight path to allow him to devote himself once again to identifying the failure.
he had to
consider, but could not confirm what his partner was doing at all.
the following speaks for itself, still no awareness...
The crew never referred either to the stall warning or the buffet that they had likely felt. This prompts the question of whether the two co-pilots were aware that the aeroplane was in a stall situation.
And finally...
When STALL 2 warning triggered and buffet appeared, the PNF was faced with an increasing incomprehension of the situation.
The PNF’s strategy was then above all to call the Captain, which occupied a large part of his resources. Since he was anxiously waiting for him to return, it is possible that the phenomenon of attention selectivity reduced his ability to perceive the STALL warning.
And to top it...
At about 2 h 11 min 38, after the PF said “I don’t have control of the plane at all“, the PNF called out “controls to the left“, took priority and made two lateral left inputs to the stop. The aeroplane was then rolling to the left.
Still no correction of the pitch!
Hell Dozy, from where does your above statement come from?
Chris ScottOnly
someone with command experience in a two-pilot cockpit can really appreciate the desirability of this traditional feature. (See my previous post of Jan 02 @1959Z.) It's particularly so when a trainee, or inexperienced copilot, is the PF.
DozyWannabe
Understood, but please humour me and try to explain. I'm not debating the desirability in this instance, I'm just not convinced
You need a mathematical formula to believe it?