Unfortunately, it would seem your agenda is to denigrate the Australian aviation system and its associated bodies and staff at every opportunity. That is well and truly apparent in many of your posts.
MLE,
If you actually read what I say, and not what you think I say, you will understand I have long criticized the Australian approach to rote "radio procedures", as opposed to effective communications. And those unions that have stood in the way of reform.
Indeed, the whole reason for the very existence of the AIPA, was the refusal of AFAP, across many issues, to except modernization and reform. To name but a few: F/E on all aircraft with more than 100 seats, no "glass cockpits", no intersection takeoffs, no derated /flexi thrust takeoff power --- and many more. AFAP was standing in the way of us operating our B767 the way Boeing designed them. Remember the nonsense of F/E in Ansett B767.
A good starting point would be to compare ICAO recommended phraseologies with the page after page of same in the AIP. Also consider the CASA proposal, not yet dead, to make the AIP phraseologies legally enforceable, on pain of strict liability penalties.
As to the B727/DC-8 ---
why was the DC-8 still on the runway?
Because the clearance was something like: "Take next taxiway right, backtrack, call ground xxx.x"
This is exactly what the DC-8 did --- followed the clearance in internationally accepted/ICAO terms, at the next taxiway, they did a 180 and backtracked on the runway.
In internationally accepted/ICAO terms, you can only backtrack on a runway, not a taxiway. The frequency change instruction should have been something like "when clear, call ground xxx.x". With the DC-8 in ground, it did not hear the takeoff clearance for the B727.
I well recall the ATC standards mob in DCA being referred to as the "Airstapo", their penchant for disciplining individual controllers who had exercised initiative was hardly a secret.
As to the Kingair, it was clear the aircraft was in trouble, the controller knew the aircraft had an engine failure and was having performance problems, but initiative was forcefully discouraged, the Kingair was not cleared No1, because it did not declare a formal emergency.
As to the close go between an executive jet and a Continental DC-10. Australia phraseology at the time was "cruise (say) FL350" instead of "climb to/Climb to and maintain FL350".
In ICAO and US terminology, "Cruise 350" was a clearance for a cruise climb, to cruise at anywhere between 350 and the minimum level for the airway, and included a clearance to descend when ready to the IAP for the filed destination".
As Murphy's law dictates, the two aircraft were extremely close to being at the same point and height at the same time.
Just as we see with ATSB now, how the investigation report dealt with this was a masterpiece of bureaucratic obfuscation to conceal the Australian "regulatory" contribution to the near hit.
If one was able to go back into the records of the AFAP/Overseas Branch Tec Sub Committee of the day, you would find we were well aware of the problem of "same words, different meanings" in Qantas, and had written to the powers that be, (particularly "cruise" v. "maintain") and been completely ignored, until the inevitable.
As to regarding BASI/ATSB reports as "the whole truth and nothing but the truth" and being a wholly reliable source for all the details, warts and all, of an accident or incident ---- how would you describe the recent reports of the Norfolk ditching or the Canley Vale fatal. Do they tell the whole story. If you think they do, why are we having the Senate RRAT inquiry.
All reports of serious incidents and accidents, especially if a foreign aircraft is involved, are politically influenced ----
there were three "investigations" into the B727/DC-8 accident --- did you know that??
Rest assured, I shall continue to criticise associations/unions and individuals who stand in the way of advancements in cost/benefit justified risk reduction, or much needed reforms, or associations that promote "changes" that are for the benefit of the associations, particularly commercial benefit , and not aviation in general, for whatever reason.
That goes double when I hear that "cultural differences" (pig headed parochialism) prevent practices that are entirely successful elsewhere, particularly in the NZ/US/CA/UK, "working in Australia". Such views usually emanating from dolts who have no relevant experience outside Australia's very small aviation pond.
Tootle pip!!