I think FGD135 is referring to a scenario where there is a problem (or something is plain wrong) with a checklist which makes it unusable, and they've told their employer.
Thanks, UTR - that is exactly the situation I was referring to.
If you can give an example of "unworkable" items ...
Consider a "prelanding" checklist that has "gear down - 3 greens" near the top, with another dozen, trivial, items following (a not unusual feature of the bloated and poorly designed checklists I have seen).
Company SOPs may dictate that the gear is to be extended on mid/late downwind, and if you conform with this, then you can't begin this checklist until after the gear is down, by which time there is insufficient time to check the remaining items properly.
And to top that off, there may be a "finals" checklist with another half dozen, generally trivial items (e.g, another check that the gear is down).
The risks of an accident/incident during the approach to land - especially at night - is greatly elevated when a pilot attempts to conform to such checklists. It could be said that the pilot has a moral duty to NOT use the checklist in such circumstances.
And no, I am not referring to the checklist as a "do list". I am referring to it as strictly a "check list". Which means that you can DO the actions at any time (and any order), but must CHECK those actions strictly via the checklist - in the order presented on the checklist.
A checklist is something that should be respected by pilots, but such a checklist tends to be regarded with contempt - and not used at all.
A well designed checklist will recognise the human factors that are an unavoidable aspect of piloting an aircraft. Those "human factors" mean that even the most disciplined and professional pilots will disrespect checklists that are unnecessarily bloated. Lives have been lost in checklist-related accidents at airlines where checklist abuse was widespread.
If the company has been informed of the major safety deficiency that non-use of the checklists represents, and they take no action (other than to remind pilots they should be using the checklist), then the company would be found to be at fault in any accident where misuse of the checklist was a causal factor.
How the otherwise intelligent C&T staff that create chronically bloated checklists can imagine their pilots diligently checking each and every item on the chronically bloated checklist is beyond my comprehension.