Hello R&H.
Each of the Australian armed forces has been guilty over time of being too ambitious and wanting to always involve in bigger scale conflicts rather than focus more on regional needs. Well before 1989, Australian Army Aviation aspired to emulate US Army Aviation, which is a huge organisation with concepts of operation well beyond what Australia could afford or operate. Australia's focus should be on doing more with much less; in other words, greater versatility and cost-effectiveness of platforms and enhanced tactical flexibility, much of which has been sacrificed by choice of inappropriate hardware, as evidenced by glaring capability gaps.
As the Brits and others have proved in Afghanistan, the support tail for a few AAH is huge and it would be interesting to compare that with the Huey II being operated on behalf of the US State Department in that theatre. See again this link and note what is probably some form of defensive sensor fitted at the end of the tail boom: Photos: Bell UH-1H Huey II (205) Aircraft Pictures | Airliners.net
In my view, there was an overkill reaction to East Timor intervention with both Army and Navy pushing strongly for expeditionary force deployment capabilities. As a result came the LPDs and MRH-90, both dubious merit platforms that are likely to create costly operating difficulties downstream for both of those Services. Tiger is arguably much less suited for possible regional tactical intimate fire support than an easier deployable Huey II Bushranger (or even a Blackhawk equivalent). Better therefore to mate Tiger with the LPDs and MRH-90 so the same shipborne supportability can be utilised in lieu of cumbersome support on the ground that would not be cost-effective. If any Australian government assigns higher priority to air resources for deterrence against interference with sea corridors, then conducting costly ongoing continuous training with Tiger would be wasteful whereas occasional weapons camps conducted for more versatile utility platforms was a more cost-effective way of maintaining basic skills.
Flying advanced aircraft means specialising. Indeed, the flying side of the house is simpler than ever. On the other hand, ‘operating’ the aircraft has become more complex. Those who have flown complex aircraft in complex missions understand this irrespective of service or type. Most militaries now stream pre wings – for good reason including economics but also to deliver a trained product within a reasonable time frame. I think it is safe to assume the likelihood of cross streaming is becoming very remote given the specialist nature of the aircraft and battlefield.
Your 'complexity' argument is dubious. Similar technological advances apply across the whole spectrum of military hardware and operations. As in airlines, militaries have always adapted very quickly to such change, for example, the introduction of unmanned platforms. If the insular approach was taken of not continually feeding new blood through all air capabilities, difficulties would compound regarding job satisfaction and flexible utilisation of manpower, which have already become evident with the aircrew streaming approach. Your 'reasonable timeframe' argument also fails considering the now long delays for ADF pilots awaiting conversion courses post-graduation.
Australian Army Aviation was in much better shape in 1989 when it first received battlefield support helos from the Air Force than it is today. Since then, vast sums of money have been spent on that Air arm to the detriment of the other Army fighting arms and I guess it remains to be seen whether AAAvn endures as pressure for economies builds. As previously proven, aviators do not have to be brainwashed Army types to provide effective air support for that Service.