Bryan, 4Greens, et al, whilst ICATEE is a laudable effort, it is only one contribution amongst many required to address the ‘LOC problem’. It is a much needed bottom up initiative which could, or has had some impact, but the approach via ICAO (who only recommend) is likely to slow any timely effectiveness. Even then action depends on national authorities for rule making, operators to train, and individuals to learn, remember and respond.
The addition of ‘prevention’ in the ICATEE strategy perhaps acknowledges the scope of the problem and that LOC recovery is subsequent to identification and avoidance of hazardous situations.
There are varied and wide ranging views of ‘the problem’. In some incidents the crew created the LOC, or it involved weaknesses in the man-machine interface, and other (most) accidents involved the failure to understand the situation. Previous discussions homed in on the man or the machine depending on point of view; but with evolving understanding of human behaviour and the changing need for automation in complex operating situations, a wider systematic view is required.
Systems thinking and problem solving can be complicated, but with a generic (abstract) view, some key aspects can be identified.
Fundamental human behaviour isn’t changing, or the difficulty in shaping it. However, the world social and professional climate is changing, and this may (adversely) affect the human.
Automation will always have weaknesses; design and training can help, but these have variable effectiveness. Redesign may take years; but specifics like stall warning and aircraft trim might warrant urgent action.
Training depends on memory and understanding, and ultimately on the human to assess a situation, to recall actions, and then act.
All of the activities in these areas require some remedial action; the key question is which are the more important, which will be effective, which can be afforded, etc. This requires overall co-ordination, at least at national authority level. However, I suspect that this will become fragmented – design / certification, training, checking / licencing, etc, such that at the operator level any effectiveness might be ‘lost’ within the generally ‘over documented’ regulations or ‘jump through the hoop’ cultures.
The above might be a sceptical view – subject to many biases, particularly hindsight, but I wonder if LOC recovery training (based on historical accidents and hindsight) is really what the industry requires to maintain future safety.
My bet is on avoidance; training and improved technology to aid awareness, and provision of additional situational safety margins to help protect humans from themselves. Priority technical changes would include stall warning and the need for auto-trim / trim follow-up systems to provide the crew with appropriate cues for aircraft control.
In a rapidly changing commercial environment, we may not see (or need) much training specifically relating to recent high profile LOC accidents.