Some feedback from 2 eagles luncheons this week.
Regarding RAAF pilot issues. Super Hornet training at 6SQN is grinding to a halt due resignation of several instructor pilots recruited by Middle East militaries. They are being offered a 4 year contract at $150K per year tax free plus a $40K accommodation consideration and other perks, compared with their roughly $100K p.a. in the ADF, which is fully taxable. Few also like the role of flying with back-seaters very much.
Several new aircraft have been recently introduced, namely C-17, KC-30, Wedgetail. This has soaked up pilot resources as new aircraft do while building up to full squadron strength which can take 2 or 3 years. There is apparently some shortage of pilots for Wedgetail at present.
Many of us at a mid-week luncheon had a multiple role Air Force flying career and ponder why the RAAF has moved away from this more flexible approach to separate streaming of pilots for strike/fighter roles. Broader flying career possibilities would be more likely to encourage continued service due to greater job satisfaction.
Airline recruiting has had a lesser effect recently than in the past. About mid-2012, it seemed likely that Qantas would soon retrench about 300 to 500 pilots, but that action may have been stalled due to the machinations going on within that company.
Back to the thread theme. I do not really see any great difficulty integrating Army pilots into Air Force or Navy, if that was desirable as an efficiency measure and the possible need for some additional flying training has been adequately explained by others.
Methinks there is a sort of blind doctrinal following of how the US Army thinks regarding integration of ARH for example into the Army so-called combined arms package. Both the RAAF and RAN were pretty intimately involved with aviation support for the Army over decades and the jointery bit generally worked pretty well at the operating level in my view. Army has often had other forces air elements under their operational control and any notion that Air Force and Navy aircrew could not adequately understand Army operations is somewhat astray, particularly considering the now more unified nature of the ADF with joint force emphasis.
The ADF seems stuck with the Tiger for now, but it is arguably a less effective platform for intimate close air support and armed scout/reconnaissance capabilities than types previously operated in those roles that were easily enhanceable at modest cost. Sensors can be retro-fitted to many platforms to optimise role flexibility. Government policy and national strategic assessments of course govern which of say F-18 air defence/ground attack and Tiger weapons capabilities would have priority if economy measures are deemed necessary.
If present helo force structure planning proceeds, easy deployability and field supportability of cost-effective types will be forfeited. The Canberra class aircraft carriers were ostensibly acquired to enable transportation of expeditionary forces, but that might become a lesser priority for the ADF in DWP2013. However, that seaborne force concept was used to justify a whole bunch of MRH-90 (although not marinised), so perhaps better to lump the LPDs, MRH-90 and Tiger together for that purpose within Navy. Only modest spending would be necessary to enhance Kiowa, Blackhawk and any remaining Iroquois to retain their very versatile capabilities, whichever air arm operates those land-based platforms.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 14th Dec 2012 at 17:28.