Australian defence organisation considerations
The crucial issue of organisation, because nothing functions effectively if that feature is deficient, usually gets somewhat missed in defence debate. I did Quality Assurance Auditor (ISO9001) training in the UK a couple of decades back which is oriented toward analysing the charters of management structures, lines of responsibility and why functions do or don't work properly.
Pre-ADF formation in 1974, the respective Australian armed forces were properly subject to political direction with smallish elements of the Public Service embedded in the respective Service headquarters. Command of operations was largely managed remote from Canberra embracing Army Field Force Command, RAN Fleet Headquarters and RAAF Operational Command and all worked very cooperatively in my experience. But now, a hugely expensive (and arguably needless) Joint Force HQ is being established in Canberra that will inevitably result in the ADF being micro-managed from the highest levels rather than command being delegated to the lowest practicable level.
The Tange Re-organisation in 1974 diluted ministerial representation for each of the armed forces and instituted a structure wherein the Public Service component of DoD has grown prodigiously and now dominates the military. In the words of a colleague at a lunching of eagles yesterday, 'The Public Servants now have the whole defence scene well and truly by the balls'. He retired as a 2 Star recently but got called back temporarily to help assess the RAN ship maintenance quagmire, so has his finger on the pulse.
The political nouse or will to curb this Public Service domination seems absent, but neither have there been any military chiefs in recent decades prepared to fall on their swords if necessary to publicly propose remediation of the DoD structure. Prima facie, some of the senior military seem so brainwashed by the DoD culture that they have been complicit in the origination of flawed planning, like the disastrous ADF Helicopter Strategic Master Plan.
Decaying helo fleet operational capacity must be remedied which seems unlikely to happen in timely fashion by awaiting doubtful full operational capability of Tiger and MRH-90. Better to look at cost-effective optimisation of other assets still available. The big problem though is to get DoD to admit that military preparedness is declining because the Defence Capability Plan spawned by DWP2009 was ill-conceived.
Foreseeable constraints on defence expenditure will ultimately force some rationalisation of the Australian military and the ADF helo force would be a good start point. It will become increasingly more difficult to justify retention of 3 separate air arms.
Last edited by Bushranger 71; 12th Dec 2012 at 23:01.
Reason: Context