Hi Lyman,
I didn't neglect anything: See my "analysis" paragraph where A2 & B2 (i.e. the missing spacer, hence the not complete U/C) are quoted. Regarding the "intact" U/C... well, one tyre blown by the strip, it's no more intact.
My point is that rolling on the strip was enough to start the leak & fire.
And the fire itself was enough to crash the plane.
The drift to the weeds, the wiped out light, and the early rotation (whatever their cause(s)) are irrelevant, here, as they would have no influence on the fire and its structural consequences:
Fire => Serious & quickly worsening damages to wing & surfaces => aircraft uncontrollable => loss of control before it had time to land anywhere => crash inevitable.
Even on a perfectly balanced airplane, taking off straight on the centerline (which a BA Concorde would not be, because part if not most/all of the drift to the left was due to loss of thrust following engine surges/FoD ingestion, spacer or not spacer - see my MP).
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Now, you imagine an RTO.
First, I don't think an RTO after V1 is likely to have occured at BA.
Not without hindsight, as it would have been a violation of procedures
(that even AF didn't do
)
But what if it did occur? BEA did the maths, for the CDG runway, I suppose the conclusions would have been roughly equivalent @ LHR or elsewhere:
§1.16.13.4 Consequences of Aborting the Takeoff
Two simulations of a possible acceleration-stop were performed, one based on the aircraft’s speed when the rotation was commenced (that is to say in fact the first moment when the crew could have been warned by unusual sensations), at 183 kt, the other at 196 kt, when the FE said what can be understood as “stop”.
The simulations were conducted with the following hypotheses:
• braking on seven wheels, to take into account the destruction of tyre No 2,
• braking torque available at nominal value until the maximum energy indicated in the Flight Manual (70 MJ), increased by 10%,
• use of thrust reversers on engines 1, 3 and 4.
With this set of hypotheses, it appears that the residual speed of the aircraft at the end of the runway would have been 74 kt for a takeoff aborted at 183 kt and 115 kt for a takeoff aborted at 196 kt.
These figures show that an aborted takeoff would have led to a runway excursion at such a speed that, taking into account the fire, the result would probably have been catastrophic for the aircraft and its occupants.
The sole difference I can see re: a BA Concorde would be thrust reversers, on 4 engines and not 3. It remains unclear if the #2 (or the #1 for that matter) would have been able to produce any significant thrust (reversed or not) particularly in a decceleration phase (more hot gases injested). Even if we imagine all 4 reversers OK, the aircraft would still overrun at significant speed (even if less than calculated by the BEA above), and the conclusion still stands: overrun + massive fire = catastrophic results.