500N
A couple of points in reply to your "couple of points":
I (fairly obviously in my opinion) wasn't advocating putting 300 Argentinians in each Hercules. I was simply pointing out that a nominal peacetime figure of say 60 wasn't set in stone, and could be increased considerably for a one off (maybe one way) operation.
Yes the plan has bugger all reserve built in - IT'S A GAMBLE!!
Pre infiltrated SF units may be compromised, that is a risk you take - IT'S A GAMBLE!!
Support/resupply - what support/resupply did the troops who landed at Pegasus Bridge get, or have planned. "Hold until relieved". What did the troops at Arnhem effectively get? The plan might only require these troops to hold on for 48hrs, so they go in with food/ammo for that timescale. Might there be options for helo resupply from vessels at sea once the 4 x Typhoon and rapier are not a threat, a couple of UH-1Hs every few hours with ammo?
Taking MPA by airborne assault would not be the way I would envisage ultimately taking the Falkland Islands. It's more about denying the use of MPA to the Brits for say 48hrs as part of an overall plan. That would give the Argentinians TOTAL air superiority, and deny the UK any resupply option to the Islands. The Falkland Islands are ultimately taken by helo/amphibious assault while the air assault on MPA ties up UK ground forces and denies the UK any FJ assets to disrupt Argentine operations.
Yes, you can debate the paucity of Argentine amphibious assets, but it doesn't have to be done by hi-tech specialist naval units, rather by make do and mend platforms, perhaps civil assets converted with make do helo platforms.
It's about thinking outside the box, putting together a package/plan that COULD work, and a country/political elite WILLING TO TAKE A GAMBLE on the basis they have everything to gain, and maybe not that much to lose! Whereas we have everything to lose, and nothing much to gain.
It's also about us taking the threat seriously...
Last edited by Biggus; 11th Dec 2012 at 08:35.