Just to clarify things a bit, the magazine story about intact GR9s was probably true when the piece was written. I never suggested that buying them back would be a good idea or a likely proposal, for all sorts of reasons. However, I still think there are other options (notwithstanding political issues as outlined by Courtney - although I wonder whether our politicians have actually asked) in addition to embarking USMC Harriers, although embarking US or other Harriers would go a long way towards reducing loss of skills post SDSR.
I think Italy and Spain might be willing to lend a few, as their economies are in a worse state than ours. We would only need a few to get some fixed wing carrier aviation going in preparation to CVF/F35B (perhaps a few aircraft attached to NFSF(FW)?), and to maintain some organic capability to extend the teach of naval task groups.
Anyway, the two rumours I heard (one I overheard, the other was told to me) were both credible, from credible sources. Neither mentioned Harrier directly. One of them made a lot of sense, and seemed to fit in with public announcements and the like. The other made some sense, but did not seem to fit with other information and details (round plugs into square holes - which are already occupied), so instead of putting two and two together, I reasoned that it did not add up, which suggests that other things may need to be considered.
Since SDSR, and the start of this thread, things have changed:
1. We have a STOVL future to prepare for
2. The problem of growing the RN fixed wing pilot cadre for the future has started to prove to me difficult
3. The world has changed with the Arab Spring and other international changes
4. HM Government has indicated its willingness to get involved in conflicts this decade: see public comments about Iran or Syria
5. Worryingly, the availability of US Carriers seems to have gone down.
It seems to me that the decision was based on and justified by assumptions, most of which no longer apply, such as the idea that the Harrier force was purely seedcorn for a STOVL future, so when F35C was chosen the Harrier could be safely axed without impacting our ability to prepare for the future or operational capability. We were assured that the politicians had read the tea leaves and saw no new conflicts this decade.
Neither assumption lasted long. Unfortunately, experience tells us that it will take a serious loss with major loss of life to make the politicians decide to do something about it. The politicians may think that having no embarked aircraft for a decade poses no danger to the safety and viability of future carrier operations - but
some disagree. Likewise,
not everyone sees the lack of carrier capability as a minor issue.
Many PPRuNe threads are about the failure of MOD to mitigate and manage risks, and provide safe and effective aircraft, including the loss of skills of those involved in ensuring aircraft safety. Why does this logic not apply to the very real risk of carrier flight deck crews and others involved in whole ship aspects losing their skills?
Once upon a time, not too long ago, the MOD and RN websites would be full of stories of exercises where a task group went somewhere and the Sea Harriers and Harriers had intercepted other aircraft, attacked targets ashore, flown reece missions, and so on. It was all routine. Now, we get stories of
embarked Apaches doing their stuff (but with less range, slower speed, and a smaller weapon load than a fixed wing aircraft), and of
a Minehunter trying to defend herself against air attack. But how will Apache cope with enemy MiGs defending the target, or MiGs attacking our ships?
It seems so incoherent. We have STOVL capable ships, STOVL trained pilots and carrier crews, have a STOVL future to prepare for, and STOVL aircraft do exist, meanwhile the politicians speak loudly and seem keen to sign us up to new conflicts.
The politicians
could make this into a complete success.
To quote
another retired Admiral:
Therefore, for practical, presentational and tactical reasons, the RN urgently needs to develop a vision and two operational concepts – one for the period covered by the carrier and naval air 'holiday' and another for when the carrier(s) enter(s) service, with a recognisable migration path linking the two. They particularly need to address the uncertainties and inconsistencies of the carrier programme, as well as outlining a more sophisticated, innovative and agile approach to force generation, procurement and skills development. It would typically need to include operationalised modular and adaptive solutions, the retention of long-lead, but surplus, platforms, smart regeneration programmes and more intelligent use of reserves, especially those who have already acquired advanced skills and experience during previous regular service.
Makes you think doesn't it? As I said elsewhere, if I wanted to prepare to run a marathon, I would not start by cutting one of my legs off (presumably with the aim of reducing trainer costs by half).