Aviation safety is predicated on certification to standards and maintenance to standards.
Every new product enters with unknowns and enters the total fleet with long standing products that have a mix of known risk (under maintenance plans) and unknowns (defects that haven't been exposed yet, and last but by no means least, maintenance hacks). On top of all this is the learning curve of the operators (crew members and mechanics).
The new products end up on the left edge of the bathtub curve mostly because the user plan (how to fly it and how to maintain it) haven't adjusted yet to the individual new problems that crop up. By the time the product is in service a year or more these lessons are well learned and we end up at the bottom of the curve as things begin to wear faster than anticipated in inspections and maintained plans. The curve turns upwards when the used product shifts to 3rd tier operators who are unable or unwilling to keep up0 with the wear out modes.
From a risk standpoint one simply looks at the rates of serious consequences in balance with exposure (how many similar products).
Sure, one bang sounds serious only when you imagine a hundred more in quick succession. But then again the response of the manufacturers and the operators to understand and provide closure on the problem is always fast enough to limit the total exposure to the passenger.
Nothing new here in this thread and maybe time to move it to more technical discussions until something else shows up in R&N