AQON 3 of the ATSB PDF is an interesting one and perhaps should be read in conjunction with both AQON 4 of the CASA PDF and indeed
recommendation R2000040, here’s Q4 and the ATSB answer:
12. HANSARD, PG 66
Mr Sangston: There was a second meeting whereby we met with a gentleman, John Grima, in CASA and we discussed the proposal again. If you peruse the letter that initially went to CASA, you will see that from our standpoint there was no proposal or intent to mandate any resolution. Indeed, the way we identify our safety issues is to identify the safety issue and then the owner, if you like—which in this case was CASA— would develop the response to the safety issue.
CHAIR: But you had a meeting with them to discuss their difference of position between yours and theirs.
Mr Sangston: We had an initial meeting to discuss the safety issue as I have just described and then there was a second meeting to discuss what CASA understood was the—
CHAIR: The tidying up meeting so that they did not have a public scrap with you: 'Hang on! We'd better'—that is what they are saying here.
Mr Sangston: I was not at that meeting, Senator, but I have got the letter back from CASA in which they outlined a lot of the in-place regulatory and other guidance in terms of the safety issue, but there was no—
CHAIR: They identified to you that they had a clear division of opinion within CASA?
Mr Sangston: No.
CHAIR: Because, obviously, speak no evil, hear no evil: we didn't talk. So to the best of your knowledge, they did not talk.
Mr Sangston: That did not come up in that meeting, no.
CHAIR: Or the other one that you were not at.
Mr Sangston: Not from what I understand.
CHAIR: So can you take that on notice and refer to us any email trail around that issue?
ATSB response:
The ATSB held an initial meeting by videoconference with CASA staff on 3 February 2010 to discuss a developing safety issue in respect of the lack of guidance for pilots when exposed to previously unforecast meteorological conditions on long flights to destinations with no nearby alternates. Based on the evidence to hand at the time, this issue was represented and discussed from the ATSB standpoint as a critical safety issue.
Subsequently, CASA wrote to the ATSB (CASA letter AT10/23 of 26 March 2010 refers) and provided formal comment on the developing safety issue. CASA offered for the ATSB to contact , (FOI deletion) Manager, Flight Operations should there be any questions or the ATSB wish to meet and discuss this matter. The ATSB agreed to arrange a face-to-face meeting with the subject matter experts at CASA.
This follow-up meeting was held in CASA’s Woden, ACT offices at 1430 on 22 April 2010. (FOI deletion) and a number of other CASA staff met with ATSB investigators (FOI deletion) and discussed the safety issue further. The CASA staff advised the ATSB that they believed the current Regulations and guidance material covered the issue satisfactorily, which was consistent with the content of CASA’s letter of 26 March 2012. At no stage during the meeting did the CASA staff advise the ATSB investigators that there may have been a difference of opinion within CASA.
Here is R20000040:
Recommendation R20000040
As can be seen R20000040 dealt with pretty much the same issues except over a dozen years before. However the most revealing bit is the final response text and the fact that the SR was “Closed – Accepted”
:
Initial Response
Date Issued: 27 April 2000
Response from: Bureau Of Meteorology
Response Status: Closed - Accepted
Response Text:
In response to your letter of 25 February 2000 relating to Air Safety Recommendation 20000040 and the reliability of meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island, the Bureau of Meteorology has explored a number of possible ways to increase the reliability of forecasts for flights to the Island.
There are several factors which determine the accuracy and reliability of the forecasts. The first is the quality and timeliness of the baseline observational data from Norfolk Island itself. The second is the information base (including both conventional surface observational data and information from meteorological satellites and other sources) in the larger Eastern Australia-Southwest Pacific region. The third is the overall scientific capability of the Bureau's forecast models and systems and, in particular, their skill in forecasting the behaviour of the highly localised influences which can impact on conditions on Norfolk Island. And the fourth relates to the speed and responsiveness with which critical information on changing weather conditions (forecast or observed) can be conveyed to those who need it for immediate decision making.
As you are aware, the Bureau commits significant resources to maintaining its observing program at Norfolk Island. While the primary purpose of those observations is to support the overall large-scale monitoring and modelling of meteorological conditions in the Western Pacific, and the operation of the observing station is funded by the Bureau on that basis, it is staffed by highly trained observers with long experience in support of aviation. As far as is possible with available staff numbers, the observers are rostered to cover arrivals of regular flights and rosters are adjusted to cover the arrival of notified delayed flights.
The Norfolk Island Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) is produced by experienced professional meteorologists located in the Bureau's New South Wales Regional Forecasting Centre in Sydney. The terminal forecast provides predictions of wind, visibility, cloud amount and base height and weather routinely every six hours. Weather conditions are continuously monitored and the terminal forecast is amended as necessary in line with air safety requirements. The forecasters have full access to all the Bureau's synoptic meteorological data for the region and guidance material from both Australian and overseas prediction models. As part of the forecasting process, they continuously monitor all available information from the region including the observational data from Norfolk Island itself. When consideration of the latest observational data in the context of the overall meteorological situations suggests the need to modify the terminal forecast, amendments are issued as quickly as possible.
Despite the best efforts of the Bureau's observing and forecasting staff, it is clear that it is not always possible to get vital information to the right place as quickly as it is needed and the inherent scientific complexity of weather forecasting means that occasional serious forecast errors will continue to be unavoidable. That said, the Bureau has carefully reviewed the Norfolk Island situation in order to find ways of improving the accuracy and reliability of its forecasts for aviation through a range of short and longer-term means.
As part of its strategic research effort in forecast improvement, the Bureau of Meteorology Research Centre is undertaking a number of projects aimed at increasing scientific knowledge specifically applied to the provision of aviation weather services. Research projects are focussed on the detection and prediction of fog and low cloud and are based on extensive research into the science of numerical weather prediction. However, with the current level of scientific knowledge, the terminal forecasts for Norfolk Island cannot be expected to be reliable 100 percent of the time. Based on figures available for the period January 1998 to March 2000 (some 12 000 forecast hours), the Bureau's TAF verification system shows that for category A and B aircraft when conditions were forecast to be above the minima, the probability of encountering adverse weather conditions at Norfolk Island airport was 0.6%.
As part of its investigations, the Bureau has considered the installation of a weather watch radar facility at Norfolk Island with remote access in the NSW Regional Forecast Centre. Although routine radar coverage would enable the early detection of precipitation in the vicinity of the Island, investigations suggest that the impact of the radar images in improving forecast accuracy would be on the time-scale of one to two hours. This time frame is outside the point of no return for current aircraft servicing the route. It was concluded that the installation of a weather watch radar would be relatively expensive and would only partially address the forecast deficiencies identified in Air Safety Recommendation R20000040. The Bureau will however keep this option under review.
To increase the responsiveness of the terminal forecasts to changes in conditions at Norfolk Island, the Bureau has issued instructions to observing staff to ensure forecasters at the Sydney RFC are notified directly by telephone of any discrepancies between the current forecast and actual conditions. This arrangement will increase the responsiveness of the system particularly during periods of fluctuating conditions. In addition the Bureau has provided the aerodrome manager with access to a display of the latest observations to ensure the most up to date information is relayed to aircraft.
The Bureau is actively participating in the review of fuel requirements for flights to remote islands being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
I regret the delay in replying to your letter but the Bureau has felt it important to look carefully at all aspects of the Norfolk Island forecast situation and consider the full range of possibilities for forecast improvement within the resources available to us. We will continue to work on forecast improvement for Norfolk Island as resources permit.
Given the open ended response from the BOM how is it possible that the ATSB effectively closed the loop on this significant safety issue by closing and accepting a very open ended response to the SR?
Then virtually the same safety issue rears its ugly head over a decade later…I think Sunny the virtual layman could understand the absurdity of this scenario!!
If the ATSB had of kept the original SR open then instead of arguing the toss with the regulator all they would have had to have done is reissue the original SR and add CASA as another party to the ‘issue owner’ column. Even ‘Blind Freddy’ can tell that the 2000 safety issue had not been properly addressed…not by a long shot!