Okay onwards and downwards to the CASA answer to Q4.
Again this was one of those golden moments in the hearing where all the arrogance, bluster and posturing led to an extreme couple of faux pa (foot in mouth disease). Examples: “Mr McCormick: As far as that report goes and the recommendation and what the disposition was, we will have to take that on notice. None of us were involved, unfortunately, in the year 2000”or; “Can anyone at this table please tell me what the review involved? When was that review concluded?”
It appeared at the time that no one at the table wanted to help their esteemed leader out on an issue that, given the circumstances, they should all have been fully briefed on.
Then there was the AQON:
CASA04: ATSB recommendation in 2000 on weather forecasts at Norfolk Island and
fuel requirements
Hansard: p.44-45, 46
Senator XENOPHON: Could I just go to an issue back, again, on the 22 February 2000? The ATSB made a recommendation to the Bureau of Meteorology about aviation safety issues inactions in terms of the reliability of Norfolk Island forecasts. Are you familiar with that at all?
Mr McCormick: No, I am not.
Senator XENOPHON: Okay. Perhaps you could take that on notice; it talks about the safety deficiency and the unreliability of the weather forecasts at Norfolk Island—
Mr McCormick: Sorry, that is a recommendation to BOM?
Senator XENOPHON: Yes, to the Bureau of Meteorology. But it does actually make reference to:
SAFETY ACTION
As a result of these occurrences, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has commenced a project to review the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands.
The report on Norfolk Island, the recommendations to the Bureau of Meteorology and the safety action is that CASA had commenced a project to review the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands. Can you tell me when that review was concluded?
Mr McCormick: We did have a project on—
Senator XENOPHON: No, perhaps you mistake me. This is back on 22 February 2000—
Mr McCormick: Oh, I see.
Senator XENOPHON: saying that a recommendation was issued to the Bureau of Meteorology and there was a safety action. There was analysis and it said:
The present level of reliability of meteorological forecasts and the current regulatory requirements are not providing an adequate level of safety for passenger-carrying services to Norfolk Island.
That was the analysis, and therefore the safety action was:
As a result of these occurrences, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has commenced a project to review the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands.
That was nearly 12 years ago—sorry, more than 12 years ago; what has happened since then?
Mr McCormick: I cannot speak for what the then regime did 12 years ago with those recommendations—
Senator XENOPHON: But you can tell me, surely? CASA obviously dealt with this pretty promptly. It was back in 2000. When was the review in relation to the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands concluded by CASA?
Mr McCormick: As far as that report goes and the recommendation and what the disposition was, we will have to take that on notice. None of us were involved, unfortunately, in the year 2000. There is a project at the moment involved in fuel for remote islands—
Senator XENOPHON: Surely, it cannot be the same project? Surely, it cannot be the same project from a recommendation issued on 22 February 2000? It cannot be!
Mr McCormick: That is the first I have heard of that recommendation, myself personally, so I do not connect the two. As I said, we will take on notice that particular report—
Senator XENOPHON: I reckon that we are going to have to have you back here, because it relates to a number of incidents in relation to a BAe 146 aircraft, a Piper Navajo Chief, a Chieftain and another BAe 146; it gives a number of instances where things got pretty hairy because of the unreliability of weather forecasts at Norfolk Island. CASA was undertaking a review in relation to fuel requirements for flights to remote islands—this is over 12 years ago—surely, it has been resolved? It must be!
Please do not tell me that there is still an ongoing review of fuel requirements for remote islands 12 years after it was raised—nearly 13 years, rather, after it was raised.
Mr McCormick: Senator, I appreciate that what you have raised there is that people should be very prudent when they are flight-planning to Norfolk Island. I agree with that, whereas the project—
Senator XENOPHON: No, no, no! I am sorry, Mr McCormick—there was a role for CASA to take:
… the Civil Aviation Safety Authority has commenced a project to review the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands.
Can anyone at this table please tell me what the review involved? When was that review concluded?
Mr McCormick: Sorry, Senator, we were not involved in this. We were not in these positions in the year 2000. I do not know what has happened to that report; I will find it out on notice.
….. Senator XENOPHON: Let's not take it any further, other than to ask you to please advise us on notice what action CASA took following recommendations made on 22 February 2000.
Mr McCormick: Yes, we will take that on notice.
Priceless really!
Shame FF's not back next week for some more good theatre!!
Answer:
The ATSB issued Recommendation R20000040 on 22 February 2000 to the Bureau of Meteorology:
SUBJECT - RELIABILITY OF NORFOLK ISLAND FORECASTS
SAFETY DEFICIENCY
The meteorological forecasts for Norfolk Island are not sufficiently reliable on some occasions to prevent pilots having to carry out unplanned diversions or holding.
Prior to 1991, the then Civil Aviation Authority published specific requirements for flights to island destinations. For example, flights to Lord Howe Island were required to carry fuel for flight to an alternate aerodrome on the mainland Australia, and flights to Norfolk Island and Cocos Island, where no alternate aerodromes were available, were required to carry a minimum of 2 hours of holding fuel.
In 1991 Civil Aviation Regulation (CAR) 234 was enacted and provided that an aircraft would not commence a flight unless the pilot in command and the operator had taken reasonable steps to ensure that the aircraft was carrying sufficient fuel and oil to enable the proposed flight to be undertaken in safety. The regulation did not specify the method for determining what was sufficient fuel in any particular case.
Civil Aviation Advisory Publication (CAAP) 234-1(0) dated March 1991 provided guidelines which set out one method that could be used to calculate fuel requirements that would satisfy CAR 234. CAAP 234-1 did not contain any special considerations or requirements when planning a flight to an island destination.
In August 1999, Civil Aviation Order 82.0 was amended to require all charter passenger carrying flights to Norfolk Island and other remote islands to carry fuel for the flight to their destination and to an alternate aerodrome. The alternate aerodrome must not be located on a remote island. This requirement to carry additional fuel does not apply to regular public transport flights to a remote island.
In a response to the ATSB dated 27 April 2000 regarding recommendation R20000040, the Bureau Of Meteorology advised that it had explored a number of possible ways to increase the reliability of forecasts for flights to the Island and was actively participating in the review of fuel requirements for flights to remote islands being undertaken by the Civil Aviation Safety Authority.
This referred to a CASA review of the fuel requirements for flights to remote islands which resulted in an amendment to Civil Aviation Order (CAO) 82.0. An amendment to CAO 82 .0 was made in August 1999; however this was reviewed during 2000 and amended again in December 2000. These amendments deleted Cocos Island but retained Norfolk Island in the definition of a remote island. It also included the conditions for passenger carrying charter operations to remote islands and the fuel requirements for those flights. Regular Public Transport (RPT) operations were not included in the amendment to CAO 82.0 as it was already a condition on an RPT Air Operators Certificate (AOC) that CASA approved both the route over which an RPT was flown and the fuel policy of the operator. Thus for RPT operations, CASA already had in place a means to regulate the carriage of adequate fuel. The making of the amendment in December 2000 concluded that particular review project.
The CAO 82.0 requirements were in force at the time of the Pel Air accident. CASA initiated a project (OS 09/13) in 2009 to address ATSB concerns that fuel quantity issues were becoming problematic. That project remains in place and the CASA agreed action in the Pel Air accident report is to review in part the fuel and alternate requirements for operations to remote islands.
Besides the fact that most of Fort Fumble’s answer was a total rehash of recommendation R20000040, see here: Recommendation R20000040...FF totally glossed over the fact that the Pel-Air operation was classified as ‘aerial work’ and therefore CAO 82.0 was completely irrelevant. The company prior to the ditching had been operating for many years with what had become a ‘normalised deviation’. This was probably because, as the Davies submission more than adequately showed, the Westwind operation couldn’t legally comply with the CAO 82.0 pax carrying charter ops requirements.
The statement that…“ Regular Public Transport (RPT) operations were not included in the amendment to CAO 82.0 as it was already a condition on an RPT Air Operators Certificate (AOC) that CASA approved both the route over which an RPT was flown and the fuel policy of the operator” …is also very interesting and given incident “199801482”…
A British Aerospace 146 (BAe146) aircraft was conducting a regular public transport (RPT) passenger service from Sydney to Norfolk Island. The terminal area forecast (TAF) for Norfolk Island indicated that cloud cover would be 3 octas with a cloud base of 2,000 ft. Approaching Norfolk Island, the crew found that the area was completely overcast.
After conducting an instrument approach, they determined that the cloud base was 600 ft, which was less than the alternate minima. Fuel for diversion to an alternate airfield was not carried on the flight because the forecast had not indicated any requirement.
….one would have to ask whether those conditions on an RPT AOC were actually working at the time?
Oh well they’ve given Senator X his answer, however I’m not sure if the answer is going to give the Senator any piece of mind though!!