This is interesting read:
http://www.infrastructure.gov.au/avi...-rev_Mar09.pdf
In particular, Geoff Edwards in early 2009, at page 22 summarises an intuitive paper:
Where Does Public Interest Lie?
Public interest in aviation safety is in practice defined by “every staff member in their own operations” (McIntyre, 2001), especially by the key decision-makers. So in turn public interest is shaped by the process and values under which key people are appointed to their positions. These have not been transparent and the language of public interest has been absent from the debate.
Managerial competence was a major factor contributing to instability during the years of reform after 1982. En route, the reforms failed at several levels: poor acceptance by stakeholders; weak forums for multi-lateral dialogue and reconciliation; fragmented accountability; clumsy executive management. These are failures of routine administration. A capable departmental Secretary and CASA CEO with a supportive CASA Chair should have been able to manage them away, even in the teeth of unrelenting fiscal pressure from the Department of Finance.
It is not possible from the material gathered to be certain whether the reforms of the post-1980 period were ultimately ‘successful’. Critics of the current regime can claim that the number of near misses indicates that the system is an `accident waiting to happen’; supporters can claim that the absence of jet fatalities shows that the regime is still working satisfactorily despite the cutting of $100 million per year of padding from the previous budgets.
Having said that, however, three fundamental observations can be made.
First, some of the internal problems have not yet been resolved. The 2008 Issues Paper and Green Paper and public submissions indicate that a coordinated and forward-looking air traffic policy is missing; tensions characterise the relationship between CASA and ATSB; and after more than a decade, the conversion of regulations to performance-based format is still incomplete. Was CASA’s skills base eroded too much in the 1990s or is the whole notion of non-prescriptive regulation misconceived anyway?
Second, global air travel is extraordinarily safe. Internationally, safety is not politicised and is not a subject of geo-political wrangling. Governments can achieve extraordinary results if they apply collective minds to an objective that is accepted as being in the public interest of all.
Third, the instability has been fuelled by the lack of a shared understanding of whether the safety regime’s customers are industry, the travelling public or the community. Until the leadership articulates a clear conception of public interest, the staff will never know whose interests they labour to serve.