Mars,
Couple of points:
(1) Why take off into a sector which appears to contain a crane and which limited the departure direction?
Wind was from 215° @ 13kt according to the report, the Captain chose 125° as a departure direction (Port side of the FSO) which was 90° to the Yetagun FSO fuselage (Ship's heading was 215°) while keeping the obstacles on his side assuming he was seating on the right seat. The starboard side of the FSO might have indeed been a clearer departure path.
(2) Was the take-off direction effected by the direction of the Yetagun platform?
Most likely since they couldn't take off into the wind and had to accept some cross wind component. The decision to go for the port side of the FSO was probably in order to keep the obstacles on the PF side which was the commander at the time.
(3) Why accept a departure with a tail-wind component?
They had a right cross wind component since they departed on a 125° heading and wind was coming from 215°. Again had they chosen the Starboard side of the FSO they could probably have had less of a cross wind component.
(4) Why take off to the port side of the FSO when the starboard side provided an obstacle-free into-wind departure?
Quite agree on that one.
(7) Why wasn't the published TDP used?
Isn't that pretty common amongst Operators though? I believe CHC uses 20 feet for its Rotation Point on its Global Ops manual, HU was apparently using 25 feet. Is anyone using 30 feet which is the published RP?
Notice though on the Analysis part of the report : "The Héli Union operations manual, approved by the DGAC, makes no reference to the TDP nor to the rotation point in its description of the procedure for engine failure during takeoff from a helideck. However, the illustration indicates a height of 20 feet above the helideck. The references and values in the operations manual should not be lower than those certified by the manufacturer. The absence of any cohesion in the definition of the reference points and associated values leads to the development of erroneous procedures, source of confusion for crews."
On the pilot testimony part we can read 30 feet which is what Sikorsky has published on its Manual, the HU Ops Manual refers to 20 feet, the PNF announced 25 feet according to the CVR transcript.
It appears from the CVR transcript that there were some communications issues between the crew (Language barrier for both sides?) as well as unclear procedures (Lack of standardization?), the FO is not assertive and responds "Yes, Yes" most times, as you mentioned the take off should have been a PC2 procedure and the Captain responds "Go ahead no problem" to the FO "Yes, the take-off is PC1, 10870 pounds".
Heli-Union unclearly describes PC2 procedure where the Vy is designated as DPATO instead of Vtoss, the exposure time between the RP and the DPATO is not depicted on the manual graph.
The final conclusions section of the report is intriguing to say the least: "All crew members and passengers evacuated." followed by "Two passengers and the co-pilot drowned."
Now the HP turbine blade failure phenomenon had been identified since 2007, corrective action was current through the TU166 modification, shouldn't F-HJCS have been retrofitted by July 2011 or already retrofitted at the factory since it was built in 2008?
Also confusing: "The captain evacuated through the right pilot’s door while the passengers and the co-pilot evacuated through the window of the right sliding passenger door." I understand the helicopter tilted over 180° onto its left side according to the pilot's testimony but is the window of the right sliding door the fastest way out for a pilot on the left seat?