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Old 12th Nov 2012, 07:37
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Mars
 
Join Date: Jun 2003
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Am I the only one who was intrigued by this report?

When this accident occurred, because it was a fatal, most of us were reluctant to comment - deciding instead to await the accident report. Having now examined the accident report including: the picture of the Yetagun FSO and platform; the traces; and the CVR commentary, I am somewhat surprised at the lack of comment in the report (and on PPRune) on the take-off procedure and direction.

Here are some questions:

(1) Why take off into a sector which appears to contain a crane and which limited the departure direction?

(2) Was the take-off direction effected by the direction of the Yetagun platform?

(3) Why accept a departure with a tail-wind component?

(4) Why take off to the port side of the FSO when the starboard side provided an obstacle-free into-wind departure?

(5) Why take-off with a starboard wind component which would draw more power from the tail-rotor?

(6) Why did the aircraft climb vertically at less than Delta power?

(7) Why wasn't the published TDP used?

In the CVR recording, the FO states "Yes, the take-off is PC1, 10870 pounds"; did that not signal that the published PC2e procedure should have been flown?

The S76C++ graphs appear to indicate that had this take-off been flown as published, a fly-away could have been achieved.

It is particularly noticeable that the vertical acceleration resembled more that published for the EC365 than that for the S76. Was that something to do with previous training, or habit, or was it a feature of the Heli-Union OM.

Have the Heli-Union procedures been amended since the accident?

Are we not intrigued that the accident investigator does not understand the nature of exposure? It covers a period when an engine failure will lead to a hazardous or catastrophic event. The only thing that can be done is to limit exposure by using minimising strategies.

If there is a real choice between operating to a CAT A (or PC2e) procedure or accepting exposure (even if the choice is marginal) shouldn't the consequences of that choice be emphasized in the OM.

Yes this has been written in hind-sight but isn't it true that there are lessons to be learnt here.

Mars
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