Guys,
After a break, I'd like to post a few observations (having recently been mentioned, which I very much appreciate). Tuc, as ever, makes a number of excellent points. I'd like to pick up on a couple of them. The first is the 'safety/airworthiness/fitness for purpose(FFP)' angle that he rightly exposes.
I have a concern that these areas continue to be confused, mixed and in some cases badly understood. I'd suggest that one way of approaching the airworthiness issue is to consider three related categories, namely 'safety', 'fit for purpose' (FFP) and 'operational effectiveness'.
Taking an example, a radio modification (or baseline design) meets 'safety' criteria if it meets the basic regulations available to contractors and PTs. If met, it won't blow up, melt wiring, fall out of the aircraft, irradiate the crew, set other devices off, and so on. (For EFP, this would have been making sure it didn't screw up fuel supplies). This is core QinetiQ/ITE stuff
Next up is FFP. That means that the radio meets its specified performance targets, can be used by the aircrew in an operational environment, doesn't screw up NVGs, meets reasonable maintenance criteria, is sufficiently reliable, and so on. (For EFP, this would have involved any maintainability aspects). This is also an ITE area, but OEUs should get involved here.
Finally, Operational effectiveness - this means that it meets the needs of a particular operation - for a radio does the secure programming work, are the frequency ranges correct, and so on. (This category is more applicable to things like DAS systems and weapons, but hopefully you get the drift) (For EFP, this would have involved meeting a specified (and testable) level of ballistic protection). Testing in this area will mainly be the province of AWC and possibly Dstl for other areas.
These three categories of 'airworthiness' are complementary, and some overlap is inevitable. Nevertheless, I've found them to be a useful way to 'slice and dice' the complex area of development, testing and acceptance into chunks that one can handle one at a time. I'd be interested to hear from others on what they think of this approach.
The next important issue Tuc highlights, which went so badly wrong on the Chinook Mk2, is the function of the RTS and the role of the RTSA. This has also attracted comments from others. I'm not at all surprised that the MAA have still not published a formal statement of the roles and responsibilities of the RTSA, as it's such a political subject.
The function of the RTS, in my view, was to allow the user (service operating authority on old speak) to take the output from the PE (or DLO, or DPA, or DE&S), add in any items not covered by the PE owned configuration (i.e. SEMs, NSMs) add in any other instructions or cautions that the operators deemed necessary, and publish them to the users in a clear and auditable form. (I will declare my hand here - after some excellent work between the PE and my team in DGA(N), we prepared the first of the 'new' RTS documents in 1993 for the Sea Harrier FA2).
The big question is who should be the RTSA. In my view, compilation and ownership of the RTS needs to rest with an organisation and people that (in MAA yuckspeak) are 'SQEP'. That is, they can build, understand, and manage a complex technical document. Again, my view only, but that needs to be engineers, working with pilots. Building an RTSR and running an RTS require basic systems engineering expertise, deep technical knowledge of the platform, and a full understanding of how the RTS must mirror configuration. Sorry, but that's engineer land. Yes, there has to be a lot of pilot input to get the limits and other aspects right, but 90% of an RTS is tech stuff.
That's why the RN used engineers in DGA(N) to produce and own the RTS. These RN engineers are the 'middle rank officers' mentioned by Pulse1, who now reside at Fleet and run the RTSs for FAA aircraft. Once DGA(N) was canned, that's where they had to go.
After a number of years doing this sort of stuff, I honestly and soberly conclude that the RAF's system of having the RTS owned by ACAS and managed by aircrew is flawed. It failed for the Chinook Mk2, and I have watched it continue to fall short to this day. (Aircraft still entering service with 'switch on' clearances for operationally essential equipment - still happening. RAF aircrew officers 'signing off' on use of time expired weapons to meet deployment dates - seen it, objected to it, got the t-shirt).
Moreover, and here is where the MAA is, i suspect, having a problem or two. First off, ACAS will be jealously guarding his RTSA role. It's a 'badge of honour' sort of thing, and is linked to the 'run by pilots, for pilots' aspect of the RAF I've posted on before. The problem, in my view, is that ACAS owning the RTSA opens up all sorts of potential for operational demands to drive issue of defective RTSs. I'm afraid I think it's still happening.
Moreover, I'm having some difficulty working out what you now need an RTSA for. PTs produce the RTS recommendation (RTSR). We have an MAA that issues Military Type Certificates for all aircraft (and mods). We have SDHs, ODHs and DDHs that use the RTS. Would it nor be logical for the PT's to produce an RTSR as per the MAA regs, get the MTC 'tick' and submit it to the ODHs for approval and use? What is the rationale for having ACAS involved in approving and managing a core safety management document, when the DHs are responsible for managing safety in service? I really think the time's come to 'pull the plug' on this arrangement.
I'm quite aware that I could be criticised for coming to these conclusions based on my own FAA background. However, having worked closely with all three services for a number of years, i honestly think that the time has come to remove the RAF from this area of the airworthiness management chain.
Sadly, given the RAF's success in getting control of the MAA (and I do, reluctantly, tip my hat to them for a quite excellent campaign) I think the chances of this happening are about zero. (I'm dismayed to see an ex ACAS getting the MAA, but if you write the SQEP specs to require a 3 star military aviator, well I suppose that means the RAF.)
I'd be interested to hear from others on these thoughts - this is a forum, let's exchange honest and polite views for mutual benefit. I certainly learn a lot from this stuff.
Best Regards as ever to all those at the pointy end doing the pointy stuff
Engines