Originally Posted by Retired F-4
After the AP disengagement until the initial pullup the UAS procedure would have been appropriate.
That is entire two seconds. I didn't mean to imply UAS needed to be done after the zoom climb, just that it wouldn't hurt going to memory items even above the practical ceiling. Too keep the aeroplane within the envelope, resorting to UAS procedure is not compulsory but it helps.
Originally Posted by Retired F-4
After the initial pullup we talk per definition about an upset situation. The upset started per Definition with SW1 and lasted until the end of the flight.
Depends on how "unintentional" is understood. CM2 certainly did not intend to stall the aeroplane but it was his actions that stalled her. Pinnacle 3701, Colgan 3407, West Carribean 708, Northwest Orient 6231 and Birgenair 301 were pretty similar in that respect. If pilot doesn't realize his actions are pushing the aeroplane towards the stall, his chances of initiating recovery are nil.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
By mistake or by what intention? To counter the deviation from assigned altitude, to correct the pitch, to arrest the climb? Or did he do it unintentionally, by chance, or because he forgot that he liked pulling?
Alternate law is still flightpath stable, to reduce pitch one must positively push - that's what fig 27 shows happened. CVR shows that CM2 first suggested it would be good idea to go down, CM1 agreed and prompted him to go down but as the warning fired second time, CM2 changed his mind and pulled again (fig 28). Why? No sensible comment was recorded on CVR.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
As they are already available (customer option, BUSS) and neednīt being newly developped, and as there is no known difficult training at the moment for those who bought that option iīd say:
BUSS is, strictly speaking, not an AoA gauge but I agree it might turn out to be satisfactory compromise regarding the BEA's recommendation.