Originally Posted by Retired F4
Then you have an different explanation for the reduction of V/S, Nz , for the SS being ND until 3 sec. before SW 2 ?
Clandestino
Simple. Airbus 330 is not F-4. Proper recovery action is not unloading but achieving stable attitude and power and then recovering the altitude (if affected at all). CM2 never achieved anything like it. He made a half-hearted attempt to reduce climb but even before he achieved anything like useful pitch, he reversed into pulling again into insane attitude for the altitude they were flying at. Insane for A330, not F-4, that is.
Quit the F4-Thing. I was qquoting BEA (for your convienience again below.
BEA Final report, bolding by me
The PNF’s intervention prompted the PF to apply inputs that reduced the pitch attitude, which had exceeded 10 degrees. Although the PF agreed that the objective should be to lose altitude, his inputs maintained the aeroplane on an ascending flight path. The crossbar then indicated a pitch-up input, which did not stimulate him to make sufficient pitch-down inputs to satisfy the PNF’s request. On his side, the PF checked the position of the thrust levers (“We are in, yeah, we are in climb”) then six seconds later reduced the thrust.
The PNF had noticed the need to stabilise the flight path, and the need for moderate aeroplane handling inputs. He probably considered that the reduction in pitch and the vertical acceleration sensed was a sufficient sign that the PF would correct the flight path to allow him to devote himself once again to identifying the failure.
Clandestino
I wasn't discussing stall recovery at all, just UAS. Is there any doubt that stall was brought on by CM2's completely inappropriate reaction? Well, I did warn about need to understand the matter discussed to have meaningful debate.
That seems to be a permanent problem, that you take out of a discussion what you like and make a comment that suits you. We, or at least that was the beginning of my involvement again, were discussing the time after the initial pitchup until SW2. After the AP disengagement until the initial pullup the UAS procedure would have been appropriate. After the initial pullup we talk per definition about an upset situation. The upset started per Definition with SW1 and lasted until the end of the flight.
Definition of aeroplane upset, Bolding by me
Aerodynamic principles applied to large, swept-wing commercial jet airplanes are similar among all manufacturers, and the recommended techniques for recovering from an upset in an airplane subject to these principles are also compatible. Pilots who understand the conditions of an upset, though such an event is unlikely, will be better prepared to recover from it. The four conditions that generally describe an airplane upset (figure 1) are unintentional:
Pitch attitude more than 25 degrees nose up.
Pitch attitude more than 10 degrees nose down.
Bank angle more than 45 degrees.
Flight within these parameters at airspeeds inappropriate for the conditions.
And from the BEA report, bolding by me
The excessive amplitude of these inputs made them unsuitable and incompatible with the recommended aeroplane handling practices for high altitude flight.
Clandestino
I have already mentioned that a pilot can have a very successful career just by doing as trained and as written in manuals without having a grasp on the basics.
There are those pilots, who had a bad day and lived through it, those who still have that day in front of them, those who never will expierience a bad day, and few who perished like AF447 did. I prefer those pilots, who have the knowledge to handle such a bad day by using knowledge and expierience.
Clandestino
He made a half-hearted attempt to reduce climb ..
By mistake or by what intention? To counter the deviation from assigned altitude, to correct the pitch, to arrest the climb? Or did he do it unintentionally, by chance, or because he forgot that he liked pulling?
It was half hearted or not enough, whatever you call it, and that is exactly what i said and what you needed to comment on with:
Clandestino True, but it was not even initiated.
OK, we agree, that you must be in disagreement, whatever another post says.
Clandestino
Loss of energy during climb in airliner is not the same as the loss of energy during maneuvering a fighter and same procedures need not be applicable.
Again you draw the comparison on a fighter aircraft and you dont have any idea of it. Hitting stall warning with 5 g´s (with 1,6 g´s a fighter is not maneuvering but merely easy turning)) on an fighter during maneuvering is no big deal, relax the g´s and that´s it.
But loss of inapropriate amount of energy or better like in this case the exchange from kinetic energy (speed) into potential energy (altitude) causes the same problems in all aircraft, if the altitude exceeds the service ceiling of the aircraft for the given GW and the given flight circumstances.
Clandestino
Anyway, figure 64 of the French report shows the calculated trajectory of the aeroplane without any crew input, demonstrating that even doing absolutely nothing would lead to much better outcome than what the crew did
We can agree, that we agree on that one.
Clandestino concerning AO
We shall see what we shall see
As they are already available (customer option, BUSS) and needn´t being newly developped, and as there is no known difficult training at the moment for those who bought that option i´d say:
We will see it in the coming aircraft, and some although not all aircraft will be retrofitted.
OK465
It's interesting 'hearing' a fighter guy talk about airliners and an airline guy talk about fighters (and I mean that in a complimentary way to both).
First, thank you Sir.
If you allow me to give your post a personal touch from my POV, than it would look like that: (bolding my insertions)
It's interesting 'hearing' a
old but not bold fighter guy talk about airliners and an
bold airline guy talk about fighters.
Thank you guys for the audience, it is time to go back lurking and spending my pension.