Originally Posted by Retired F4
New message there, pilots always do what they are trained for? Are they trained to crash too like AF447?
Well that's the point! The crew was trained to recognize and deal with UAS, they didn't follow the training. Now that in itself is a moot issue as before any abnormals aeroplane has to be under positive and proper control, which it turned out not to be. AF machines suffered from UAS before, it was the first and only that crashed.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
That s not what i do and nothing i said. , but what the PF intended to do and was not able to because of lack of manual flying expierience in FL 350 in ALT2B law.
For umpteenth time: this is severe misinterpretation of the report. If aeroplane's attitude was gyrating around some acceptable value, then one would be justified to say that pilot had a problem with manual skils. Both attitude variation and stick positions confirm that CM2 was bent on climbing the aeroplane without understanding the consequence of it and without verbalizing what are his intentions or perception of the situation and that goes against basic airline pilot training anywhere.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
Then you have an different explanation for the reduction of V/S, Nz , for the SS being ND until 3 sec. before SW 2 ?
Simple. Airbus 330 is not F-4. Proper recovery action is not unloading but achieving stable attitude and power and then recovering the altitude (if affected at all). CM2 never achieved anything like it. He made a half-hearted attempt to reduce climb but even before he achieved anything like useful pitch, he reversed into pulling again into insane attitude for the altitude they were flying at. Insane for A330, not F-4, that is.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
You are entiteled to contact BEA and tell them your point of view, especially the misuse of the unreliable airspeed procedure which would have worked well after AP-disconnect, as an high altitude approach to stall recovery procedure.
I wasn't discussing stall recovery at all, just UAS. Is there any doubt that stall was brought on by CM2's completely inappropriate reaction? Well, I did warn about need to understand the matter discussed to have meaningful debate.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
As you make yourself an expert in ACM, please note, that -1g (full ND SS) produces nearly the same drag as +2g and would be not suitable to regain energy.
Airbus 330 is not F-4. It is very low drag, low maneuverable and low powered, compared to Phantom. I referred to fact that means of complying with UAS procedure were readily available. I have already mentioned that a pilot can have a very successful career just by doing as trained and as written in manuals without having a grasp on the basics.
Loss of energy during climb in airliner is not the same as the loss of energy during maneuvering a fighter and same procedures need not be applicable.
Anyway, figure 64 of the French report shows the calculated trajectory of the aeroplane without any crew input, demonstrating that even doing absolutely nothing would lead to much better outcome than what the crew did.
As for investigating authorities, they make recommendations, based on the accident/incident they investigated and are not required to estimate the overall impact of them. That's something for manufacturers and aviation authorities to do (and is reason enough to keep investigating bodies independent). Their response might be acceptance, reject or anything in-between and gets classified by investigators as acceptable or unacceptable. Now, installing the AoA gauge seems to be the way to go to BEA but then EASA might point out that a) other crews reduced AoA in UAS situation when stall warning went off b) thousand upon thousands of civil aeroplanes are flown successfully every day without AoA gauge so the reccomendation is rejected. It is possible that compromise solution will be found with visual stall warning. It is possible recommendation will be accepted, we'll get gauges and new training procedures grafted onto existing ones. We shall see what we shall see.