Clandestino
I have repeatedly warned against trying to build advanced theories while having no firm grasp on the basics. It was a win-win proposal for me.
Folks listen to me, bandwidth wastage gets reduced.
Folks disregard, I'm kept entertained.
For those unable to take subtle hints:
Your bandwith of
self esteem will remain unchallenged.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
This returniung to the altitude was imho exactly what the PF tried, smooth and easy and no coffee cups on the floor and no passenger complaint.
Clandestino
First, that's not the way it works in the real life because a) pilots are trained to put safety before comfort b) other similar incidents have shown a) is observed in real life for most of the time by most of the crews.
New message there, pilots always do what they are trained for? Are they trained to crash too like AF447?
Clandestino
Third, calling sidestick movements recorded on FDR smooth and easy is not something I'd do but then it could be my level 2 English.
That s not what i do and nothing i said. , but what the PF intended to do and was not able to because of lack of manual flying expierience in FL 350 in ALT2B law.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Retired F4
The necessary recovery action was time critical.
Clandestino
True, but it was not even initiated.
Then you have an different explanation for the reduction of V/S, Nz , for the SS being ND until 3 sec. before SW 2 ?
BEA Final report, bolding by me
The PNF’s intervention prompted the PF to apply inputs that reduced the pitch attitude, which had exceeded 10 degrees. Although the PF agreed that the objective should be to lose altitude, his inputs maintained the aeroplane on an ascending flight path. The crossbar then indicated a pitch-up input, which did not stimulate him to make sufficient pitch-down inputs to satisfy the PNF’s request. On his side, the PF checked the position of the thrust levers (“We are in, yeah, we are in climb”) then six seconds later reduced the thrust.
The PNF had noticed the need to stabilise the flight path, and the need for moderate aeroplane handling inputs. He probably considered that the reduction in pitch and the vertical acceleration sensed was a sufficient sign that the PF would correct the flight path to allow him to devote himself once again to identifying the failure.
Clandestino
Even if they went to Climb thrust/5° pitch at the apex of their climb, aeroplane would stabilize at alpha slightly above 5° and perform gentle driftdown to 5° alpha ceiling.
It is not as important to know the reason and principles involved in procedures ............ just that many a pilot had successful and long flying carrier while being oblivious to some basic flying facts.
You are entiteled to contact BEA and tell them your point of view, especially the misuse of the unreliable airspeed procedure which would have worked well after AP-disconnect, as an high altitude approach to stall recovery procedure. Good luck with it.
BEA final report, bolding by me
In the absence of reliable speed indication, an understanding of the physics of high-altitude flying, gained through training in the fundamental principles of energy conversion, equilibriums of forces, and lift and propulsion ceilings, could have considerably helped the pilots to anticipate the rapid deterioration in their situation and to take the appropriate corrective measure in time: initiate a descent.
Clandestino
Pushing the stick full forward on Airbus gives you -1G clean (and fast enough, about which there was no doubt when second stall warning went off). That's enough enough. Now watch the ignorant bite on this one.
As you make yourself an expert in ACM, please note, that -1g (full ND SS) produces nearly the same drag as +2g and would be not suitable to regain energy.
Clandestino
Because they are absolutely inessential in transporter! We might install them one day when we go seriously about the business of air combat in A330 but I can't see it happening anytime soon.
BEA Final report, bolding by me
It is essential in order to ensure flight safety to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of the aeroplane and take the actions that may be required.
Consequently, the BEA recommends:
- that EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence of an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board aeroplanes.