I have repeatedly warned against trying to build advanced theories while having no firm grasp on the basics. It was a win-win proposal for me.
Folks listen to me, bandwidth wastage gets reduced.
Folks disregard, I'm kept entertained.
For those unable to take subtle hints: anyone proving somatogravic illusion played a role in AF447, or for that matter that the illusion of pitch down due to deceleration in any airliner incident/accident, would make such a breakthrough that he would stand a good chance of winning both Collier trophy and Nobel for medicine. Good luck with it and don't try to do it with G-CPAT incident, it was pitch-up illusion. Basic aerodynamics folks. Lift to drag. Trust to weight.
Oh and thank you for providing very interesting link, rudderudderrat - the one with very vague and general description of somatogravic illusion during takeoff and landing. Applying lessons "learned" from it to instance of UAS in cruise would have been heavy work, leaning heavily on imagination. Anyway:
Originally Posted by Operator's Guide to Human Factors in Aviation, author unknown
An inexperienced pilot may perceive deceleration due to lowering the flaps as steep nose-down sensation.
...cracked me up. Maybe if one is flying Dauntless and opens split flaps in one go. Airliner flaps are a) not so draggy b) never lowered full in one step. Makes me wonder at what operator
was that presentation aimed.
Originally Posted by Old Cartusian
Can anyone tell my why after the official report there are 35 pages of debate about what is a fairly clear sequence of events and set of causes?
It has to do something with human factors. I mean regarding to posters, not the crew.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
This returniung to the altitude was imho exactly what the PF tried, smooth and easy and no coffee cups on the floor and no passenger complaint.
First, that's not the way it works in the real life because a) pilots are trained to put safety before comfort b) other similar incidents have shown a) is observed in real life for most of the time by most of the crews. Second, CM2 warned FAs about possible turbulence ahead four minutes before UAS, therefore chances of coffee being a factor were nil. Third, calling sidestick movements recorded on FDR smooth and easy is not something I'd do but then it could be my level 2 English.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
The necessary recovery action was time critical.
True, but it was not even initiated.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
In this situation returning to the assigned altitude has to observe those specifics and the primary focus has to be angle of attack reduction and speed conservation.
In F-4 Phantom. Is it so hard to accept that airline pilots are not trained in ACM so their procedures, while still working as supposed, are not leaning heavily on maneuvering part? Even if they went to Climb thrust/5° pitch at the apex of their climb, aeroplane would stabilize at alpha slightly above 5° and perform gentle driftdown to 5° alpha ceiling.
It is not as important to know the reason and principles involved in procedures as it is important to perform the procedure timely and precisely when required. Now, I'm not saying that detailed knowledge of aeroplane, HF and air is useless, just that many a pilot had successful and long flying carrier while being oblivious to some basic flying facts.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
The normal parameters for changing altitude or regaining altitude like a special pitch change, a special change of vertical speed, a known SS input might not work in the time available.
Here we go again:
Originally Posted by BEA
The aircraft’s movements in the longitudinal axis were primarily due to the inputs by the PF, with the exception of small variations due to the aerology (variations in normal acceleration of about 0.2 g);
Pushing the stick full forward on Airbus gives you -1G clean (and fast enough, about which there was no doubt when second stall warning went off). That's enough enough. Now watch the ignorant bite on this one.
Originally Posted by Retired F4
I´m well aware that
afaik neither AOA nor normal loadfactor are readily displayed in the cockpit.
Because they are absolutely inessential in transporter! We might install them one day when we go seriously about the business of air combat in A330 but I can't see it happening anytime soon.
Originally Posted by HazelNuts39
Is a deceleration of 3 kts/sec sufficient explanation by itself, for two qualified pilots at the same time?
No, but is as convenient to derail discussion as is composite fin of AA587, NDB identifier regarding the AA965, core lock of Pinnacle 3701, or who-knows-what-not at Habsheim. Same stuff on anonymous internet fora every time Caucasian (minus Russians) crew stuffs it up. Lesson from worldwide spread of accidents is there are no American/Chinese/Russian/Somali/Graustarkian aerodynamics or physics and flying does not care a little bit about pilots' cultural background, it's just some cultures are more prone to rejecting the traditional and embracing the pragmatic - essential for aviation. Instead of understanding it, what we have on the PPRuNe is a lot folks mistakenly believing that they know something about aviation and gloat about how their cultural circle has better "safety statistics" than some other one. So then comes AF447 and dreams of immanent aeronautical superiority are shattered and we get thread upon thread of nonsense coming from those wounded by their Aeroweltanschauung suddenly shown to be false.