DozyWannabe sez:
...and the pilot engineer team led by Corps had veto power on the design specifics.
The "environment" at this time certainly was:
Management (overall philosophy, etc.)
Engineering (how to implement the overall philosophy, etc.)
And, Pilot engineers (As an important check of the above with veto power, etc.)
In this environment dealing with new frontiers it is very probable that:
Their (pilot engineers) influence in the design was reactive. The IT, automation, etc. as the "driving force", the top down "bias" that seems ultimately prevailed.
This obviously influential to marketing, sales, training, etc.
Veto power on specifics does not mean "enough power" to define the new philosophy. Not "coarse adjustments", just trim.
BTW:
I am motivated to address deeper some facts in this thread.
Could you tell me why not:
1) Inform assertively on the limitations being faced by the System
2) Orient crew clearly on proper procedure wrt to easily detectable UAS
I donīt like the "design approach" to delegate to the crew (creating "startling factors") both above issues.
This easily could generate a fatal "threshold effect" similar to the one observed in AF447 case.
And this not seems to me a "black swan" one as commented by
mm43.
Graceful degradation is very important for survivability. Anomalies can be multiples. An the Interface is the "channel" in increasingly complex Systems.