4Greens
Sorry, I meant to reply. Pulse1 is correct. One of the positives from the Nimrod Review (and there were many) was that Haddon-Cave accepted the evidence that the failures were systemic, despite MoD's claims it was a one-off. (The problem was he presented it as a revelation). Hence, he recommended a "Military" Airworthiness Authority, not a "Nimrod AA". The Secretary of State had been given the same evidence before Haddon-Cave, and he too deserves credit for accepting the systemic nature of the failings.
What I'd say though, is that the "system" became very RAF-orientated in the late 80s, with MoD(PE)'s specialist airworthiness staffs being transferred to AMSO in 1991. This transfer of independent (from the Services) staff meant PUS's regulations covering independent scrutiny could no longer be met. This conflict meant, for example, that some key airworthiness regulations could not be updated, as MoD policy now contradicted SoS's mandated regs and no-one was prepared to put his name to an update. This explains why conducting independent scrutiny became a disciplinary offence, despite it being a legal obligation.
The evidence (see link above) explains that at an HQ level, the RN removed their "Management" role from their own TORs, replacing it with "Monitoring". "Engines" has posted many times regarding the RN approach at 1st and 2nd Line, which remained excellent despite their HQ's abrogation (especially the appalling mess that was ASE). As did the RAF's, although of course they were closer in Command terms to their senior staffs who were hostile to what they were trying to achieve.
The RAF's perspective is best explained in the various Airworthiness Review Team reports, staring with the Chinook/Wessex/Puma one of August 1992. They articulate very well the day to day problems that faced RAF stations at the time, but because the Teams were actively prevented from speaking to MoD's airworthiness specialists, the underlying reasons for the problems were not explored.
Perhaps the most "entertaining" example is the use of captured Argentinean aircraft pubs. The "system" is heavily criticised, but the underlying reason why our own UK pubs weren't good enough is not explained. The answer was that, quite simply, instructions had been issued not to maintain pubs and funding was withdrawn. You'd have thought the Chief Engineer would at least fix that embarrassment, but it was his policy to chop funding, which may explain why he kept quiet. Most of the failures have similar simple explanations.