Originally Posted by RF4
Problem being, that at that point stallwarning Nr. 2 communicated approaching loss of control,
HN
Not true. The stall warning came 4 seconds after the PF started pulling. If he had maintained the nose-down input that produced 0.85 g there would have been no stall warning and no stall.
Itīs not black and white again.
Figure 27 final report
Figure 28 final report
The PF never had a steady SS, and main cause for the Stall Warning two was the impending exiting of the flight envelope due to airspeed, altitude and pitch resulting in approaching creitical AOA. The SS NU phase might have initiated it a tad earlier, but imho we dont know the effect of it, as the SS input is not necessarily immidiately transferred to a elevator deflection (FBW) and a elevator deflection does not immidiately tranfer to a flight path change (delay until the aircraft reacts). Additionally at 02:10:45 there was a thrust reduction present, just 4 seconds prior the SW2 sounded. We didnīt talk about the effects of that one jet.
The trend to more NU SS might also have been a side effect of handling the throttles from PF, first the reduction at 02:10:45 and then selecting TOGA at 02:10:56.
But basically what iīm trying to say in regard to BOACīs initial question was, that i see an early recovery attempt prior SW two (see loadfactor). The recovery attempt was not appropriate to the severity of the initial pitchup and the altitude rise and speed decay could not be stopped quickly enough. When the focus of the PF changed from the SS to power and switching indicators and the SW2 sounded, TOGA and SS position kicked the airframe outside the flight envelope without being noticed by the aircrew.
But again it is my oppinion and not fact, and everybody is entiteled to a different oppinion.