This gaping hole in monitoring has not been addressed. This is all before we stalled. Let's (please) forget sidestick, AB control laws etc etc and ask why? We understand the altimeter and v/s were working on PNF's panel. Was he so totally head down in ECAM such that he did NOT watch the shop? Add to the query how could he NOT notice the extreme pitch attitude? It does not gel in my mind. Two experienced and 'competent' trained pilots. I have said before, 'Command' (LHS in this case) calls for one short sharp instruction here, probably as they passed 36000'?? - " Put the nose down" or "I have control". Why was this inhibited?
I mentioned that before, the answer lies in day to day flying where only minimal load changes are used for pitch changes otherwise the coffee will leave the small little tables. Once the excessive pitch was established there was not enough time left to get the nose down with a gentle maneuver before the airframe ran out of flying speed. This gentle maneuver was present, look at the FDR and there to the normal load factor graph. And the concentration in this early phase was on the roll problem. Selecting TOGA in answer to the second stall warning rendered this gentle nose down / ease off maneuver useless.
The culprit was to get in such a high pitch firsthand after AP disconnect. Only a drastic maneuver would have corrected this pitch timely, and neither PF nor PNF saw the necessity for it and therefore were not prepared to execute it.